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Abstract
The cloud computing paradigm introduces an efficient utilisation of huge com-
puting resources by multiple users with minimal expense and deployment effort
compared to traditional computing facilities. Although cloud computing has in-
credible benefits, some governments and enterprises remain hesitant to transfer
their computing technology to the cloud as a consequence of the associated se-
curity challenges. Security is, therefore, a significant factor in cloud computing
adoption. Cloud services consist of three layers: Software as a Service (SaaS), Plat-
form as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Cloud computing
services are accessed through network connections and utilised by multi-users who
can share the resources through virtualisation technology. Accordingly, an efficient
access control system is crucial to prevent unauthorised access.
This thesis mainly investigates the IaaS security enhancement from an access
control point of view. IaaS requires an access control model that can cope with
its dynamic and scalable features. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) is
identified as the most appropriate model that can support IaaS features. How-
ever, ABAC does encounter challenges regarding its conceptual characteristics and
formal specifications.
Thus, a novel intelligent attribute-based access control model known as ABACsh
is proposed in this thesis for IaaS cloud. ABACsh is an enhanced attribute-based
access control that supports a context-aware mechanism and the Separation of
Duty (SoD) security principle. The intelligent framework for ABACsh is presented
based on a knowledge agent, as logic is used to infer an access decision. Hence,
there is a requirement to formulate a suitable logic that is able to specify, verify
and reason ABAC models. A formal logic known as Access Control Logic-Deontic
Logic (ACL-DL) is further proposed in this thesis. ACL-DL involves a formal lan-
guage definition and a Kripke-structure model definition. ACL-DL logic is used to
formally specify ABACsh properties and to logically reason about ABACsh access
requests.
To present the feasibility of the proposed access control model in an IaaS
platform, a demonstration of ABACsh prototype is studied in an open-source
IaaS-platform known as OpenStack; proposing an enforcement framework that
is designed based on agent architecture. Furthermore, an extended Policy De-
cision Point (PDP) is implemented based on a logical inference algorithm known
as forward chaining.
Formal verification proves that the ACL-DL satisfaction problem is PSPACE
solvable, and its model-checking problem is PTIME solvable. Evaluation of the
logic complexity profile illustrates that ACL-DL logic is computationally determ-
iii
inable, in contrast with classical logic categories. Evaluation of the ABACsh com-
putation complexity and access control quality metrics reveals superior results in
comparison with two existing ABAC models. The experimental results in an Open-
Stack testbed deployment demonstrate the feasibility of the ABACsh approach and
promise an enhanced and secure access control model for IaaS cloud.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context Background
The cloud computing paradigm is constructed based on several technologies such
as virtualisation, Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), autonomic computing, and
grid computing [41]. Cloud computing involves three main services: Software as a
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).
The focus of this research is to enhance an access control model to cope with the
IaaS environment without redesigning or modifying IaaS technology structures.
Virtualisation technology is one of the main building blocks in deploying IaaS.
Hence, the hypervisor affects the efficiency of the access control system. The hy-
pervisor introduces a security threat to the virtual machine (VM) access control
because of the single point of access. A trusted VM within an untrusted hyper-
visor has a higher risk than an untrusted VM within a trusted hypervisor [119].
For example, based on empirical experiments on a live virtual machine migration
process (LVMM) [158], it has been recommended to review the existing access
control system to avoid unauthorised access during LVMM process. The LVMM
process is considered as one of the critical processes in IaaS beside the virtual
machine provisioning process [41]. Moreover, access-control security tools in IaaS
such as firewalls and security groups cannot support context-aware mechanisms
or dynamic access control [8]. The optimisation between the information flow
security and IaaS flexibility is getting high consideration as sensitive information
maybe leaked to unauthorized entities[227, 203]. Therefore, a well-designed access
control system in IaaS is vital.
Security aspects are essential in motivating customers to adopt cloud com-
puting services. For instance, an IDS survey illustrates that 75% of customers
consider satisfaction with the degree of security and privacy as the main motiv-
ations to adopt cloud computing services [121]. In particular, the access control
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
aspect is a critical security issue in the IaaS cloud [9, 197]. In contrast to the
traditional computing environment, the IaaS cloud has specific characteristics of
elasticity, multitenancy, configurability, and dynamicity. Thus, conventional ac-
cess control models face flexibility challenges and fine-grained limitations when it
comes to their implementation and deployment in IaaS [9].
Because IaaS is a multi-tenant environment it is required to handle a variety
of user access requirements, accordingly the IaaS access-control system needs to
be a context-aware to support fine-grained policy [191]. The traditional access
control models such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) lack scalability and adaptability to dynamic changes. Even though
most cloud access control systems such as Amazon, Racspace, Dimansion Data and
Verizon use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [100], RBAC cannot cope with
a dynamic environment because it supports coarse-grained access which creates a
restricted access control policy. Also, RBAC access policy rules must be predefined
before the access-control process begins.
There is a trend to move from RBAC to Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC), as the latter is more flexible, supports context-awareness, supports fine-
grained policies, and also supports a dynamic computing environment. It is pre-
dicted that by 2020, 70% of enterprises will deploy ABAC [70] since there is
an interest among industries and governments to deploy access control based on
ABAC [99]. Further, ABAC is dynamic and requires less human administration
interaction than traditional access control models, because its authorisation pro-
cess can be computed at the time of the request, where permission is not required
to be pre-assigned to users [108]. The findings and analysis of this research match
the recommendations of several researchers to use ABAC over RBAC in a cloud
computing environment such as in [37, 44, 242].
Figure 1.1 illustrates the scope of this research. The investigation of IaaS
security challenges detailed in Sections 2.2 to 2.4 identify a research gap in the area
of access control systems. The problem statement will be elaborated in Section
1.2. Four domains of computer science form the basis of this thesis contribution, as
will be explained in Section 1.4. These domains are: IaaS cloud, Access Control,
Formal Logic, and Artificial Intelligence. Furthermore, Figure 1.1 illustrates the
research flow between the four domains.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis researches two problems, as illustrated in the tree diagram in Figure
1.2. The first problem is related to fulfilling IaaS access control requirements.
Three requirements have been identified. The first requirement is to implement a
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Figure 1.1: Overall thesis research components
context-aware mechanism that supports a fine-grained access feature. The second
requirement is to emphasise access-control security principles. With an access
control system in cloud computing, the principles of least privilege and separation
of duty(SoD) are critical [47, 119, 193]. This research focuses on deploying SoD.
The third requirement is to meet the dynamic characteristics of IaaS because it is
a changeable environment where users join and leave frequently. Furthermore, the
virtual machine configurations change based on the customer’s specifications. To
the best of our knowledge, these three requirements: context-aware mechanism,
SoD security principle, and support of dynamic characters are not addressed in the
prior literature on IaaS access control models as will be demonstrated in Chapter
3. ABAC is considered as the most appropriate access control model for IaaS
as illustrated in Section 2.5. This thesis works towards solving ABAC challenges
discussed in Section 2.6
The second problem discussed in this thesis is related to developing an access
control logic that is capable of specifying, verifying and reasoning ABAC mod-
els. To the best of available knowledge, a formal logic for ABAC models is not
addressed in the prior literature. The required logic should be decidable for it
to be implemented in a computing system. The access control logic challenge is
two-fold: firstly, it is necessary to find a suitable formal logic category for access
control security representations; secondly, a suitable formal language (also called
computational language) that can formally interpret ABAC model properties is
required. Based on the literature, the modal logic has been found to be the most
appropriate formal logic that can present access control models as justified in Sec-
tion 2.7. Regarding the ABAC, to date, no formal language has been defined.
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Figure 1.2: Problem Definition of this research
Liner-time Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computation Tree Logic(CTL) are used
for model checking. However, LTL formulas are evaluated on paths while CTL
formulas are evaluated on states [102]. In order to evaluate attribute based access
control system we need to consider states and paths as will be demonstrated in
Chapter 5
1.3 Aim and Objectives
Given the challenges that have been identified concerning the access control model
in IaaS cloud, this thesis aims to enhance IaaS cloud security by proposing an
intelligent attribute based access control model. This goal will be satisfied by
completion of the followed objectives:
Obj.1 To identify The IaaS access control model requirements, and explore the lim-
itations of traditional access control enforcement techniques in IaaS clouds.
Obj.2 To investigate how access control models need to change to meet IaaS access
control requirements, and identify the access control model best suited to
IaaS characteristics.
Obj.3 To propose an access control model enhancement that meets IaaS require-
ments.
Obj.4 To introduce a formal logic that is able to specify, verify and reason about
the proposed access control model
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Obj.5 To design an intelligent framework for the proposed access control model
that supports the dynamic and scalable features of IaaS.
Obj.6 To implement and test a prototype of the proposed access control model in
OpenStack IaaS cloud testbed.
An extensive literature review has been carried out towards fulfilling Obj.1
and Obj.2. As a result, the problem statement in Section 1.2 has been identified.
Objectives Obj.3, Obj.4, Obj.5 and Obj.6 are four steps to achieving the main aim
of this thesis. The original contributions of this thesis are explained in Section
1.4.
1.4 Original Contributions
Figure 1.3 summarises the contributions of this thesis and the motivation for cover-
ing the four computer science fields: IaaS Cloud Security, Access Control, Formal
Logic, and Artificial Intelligence. The big picture concerns the enhancement of
IaaS security by improving the access control model via the employment of artifi-
cial intelligence agent-architecture and modal logic formalisation.
Figure 1.3: Thesis Contributions
The thesis contributions are as follows:
 IaaS Cloud Security
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– Propose an enhanced attribute based access control model for IaaS
(ABACsh) that supports context-awareness mechanisms and the SoD
principle.
– Propose an enforcement architecture design for ABACsh based on Open-
Stack components.
– Demonstrate ABACsh implementation in OpenStack. Based on access
control QoS metrics, the performance evaluation of ABACsh PDP is meas-
ured by calculating the time taken to reach an access decision.
 Access Control
– Conduct an extensive study to determine the proper access control
model for IaaS.
– Define the concept behind the context-aware mechanism and the SoD
security principle in an ABACsh model.
– Perform a comparativeanalysis of ABACsh with ABAC α and HGABAC
that involves ABACsh computational complexity and QoS (Quality of
Service) metric evaluations.
 Formal Logic
– Introduce Access Control Logic-Deontic Logic (ACL-DL) as a modal
logic that is capable of specifying, verifying and reasoning ABAC mod-
els.
– ACL-DL combines Access Control Logic (ACL) modality says with
Deontic Logic (DL) modality obligation .
– Define a formal language and a Kripke-structure model for ACL-DL
logic
– Formally specify ABACsh via ACL-DL logic.
– Logically reason ABACsh access decisions via ACL-DL logic
 Artificial Intelligence
– Propose an Intelligent framework for implementing ABACsh based on
knowledge-agents o
– The inference engine is based on a forward chaining algorithm.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the literat-
ure review, which identifies a need to enhance the access control system in IaaS.
The chapter also includes a literature review of concepts used to solve the iden-
tified problem. Chapter 3 presents the enhanced Attribute-Based Access Con-
trol (ABACsh) and its computational complexity and quality metrics evaluation.
Chapter 4 explains the proposed logic that combines the Access Control Logic
(ACL) with Deontic Logic (DL). The ACL-DL logic is used to specify, verify and
reason about ABACsh, as illustrated in Chapter 5. A proposed intelligent frame-
work for ABACsh is demonstrated in Chapter 6. A prototype of this framework
is implemented and tested on an IaaS platform called OpenStack, as explained in
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and suggests future improvements and
enhancements.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates and analyses the motivation for this research based on
the literature review. It consists of eight sections. As a reference to Figure 1.1 from
the introduction, Sections 2.2 to 2.4 explore IaaS security challenges associated
with unauthorised access. Section 2.5 studies access control models which leads to
a conclusion to build the proposed access control model enhancement based on an
ABAC model. ABAC is explored in Section 2.6. The lack of a formal logic that is
able to specify, verify and reason about ABAC models leads to Section 2.7, which
researches the access control logics. Finally, there is a need to design a dynamic
access control which leads to investigating the AI field to propose a framework
that is dynamic and scalable. AI in IaaS security is discussed in Section 2.8.
2.2 Security Challenges of IaaS
The characteristics of Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) encouraged ICT customers
to adopt it as the next generation model for outsourcing IT infrastructure [238].
IaaS is capable of controlling and managing the virtualised environment repres-
ented in a virtual machine life circle by providing the virtual machine (VM) with
the requested resources, such as storage, network and processing power [65].
IaaS features offer business advantages, such as rapid elasticity and fast re-
source pooling, since IaaS deploys virtualisation technology which supports several
innovations, such as multi-core chips and live migrations [41]. A key component in
building a virtualisation environment is to operate it via the hypervisor, although
the hypervisor on its own cannot build IaaS. Therefore, a cloud-stack is required
to build IaaS, such as OpenStack, CloudStack and OpenNebula. According to the
current industry, OpenStack is likely to become a dominant cloud-stack [100].
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On the other hand, the flexibility characteristics of IaaS introduce several se-
curity challenges linked to access control implementation.The elasticity feature of
IaaS allows the cloud user (customer) to scale up and scale down to meet their
project requirements. This leads to a rapid change in the infrastructure configura-
tions. However, elasticity introduces security challenges in respect to providing an
administrative separation between the customer virtual environments. There is
a need for a security mechanism that enforces a proper configuration and change
management, as well as a fine-grained and predefined access control mechanism
[170].
The multitenant nature of IaaS which facilitates the ideal usage of infrastruc-
ture by sharing resources between multiple users faces some security challenges as
well [100]. Therefore, it is more likely that there is a need for a new type of ac-
cess control policy between tenants in intra-cloud communication [173]. A tenant
can be an enterprise in the context of a public cloud or a department within an
enterprise in the context of a private cloud [26].
The flexibility feature of IaaS enables the user to configure their own virtual
machines and computing infrastructure [237]. Hence, it is prone to misconfigura-
tion that can lead to a security violation [27]. Therefore, there is a need to monitor
cloud behaviour to figure out unexpected errors. For example, in April 2011 an
infrastructure outage caused Amazon’s Compute Cloud EC2 to be unavailable for
its customers [63]. Therefore, there is a need to monitor IaaS behaviour. In the
literature, an approach constructed on role-based access control has been proposed
[177].
The dynamicity of IaaS facilitates virtual machine (VM) mobility among phys-
ical machines for different aspects, such as server consolidation, load balancing,
data recovery and green computing is achieved through a technique called live
virtual machine migration (LVMM). LVMM allows the movement of virtual ma-
chines between the physical machines during run time with a minimum downtime
[67]. Although live migration supports IaaS dynamicity, it introduces some se-
curity threats. The protocol used for live migration moves the virtual machine
state in plain text, which allows hackers to snoop it through the network links.
Even encryption is not able to secure it, as illustrated experimentally in [158].
Therefore, there is a need for re-thinking the existing access control and isolation
mechanism.
Moreover, the dynamicity feature of IaaS affects firewall functionality since the
VM gets a dynamic IP address through a DHCP server that assigns a lease time
for the client IP address. The virtual machine must renew its IP address when
the lease time expires. Upon renewing its IP address, it may or may not receive
the same IP address that it received previously [128]. A source IP address and
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Figure 2.1: Recommended mitigation for some of IaaS security challenges
a destination IP address are basic information to generate a firewall rule. The
firewall rules remain constant unless there is an explicit need to change the policy,
as a result the firewall cannot adapt to real-time threats [210]. Any system that
uses predetermined and fixed IPs might impose some limitation on the dynamism
and the scalability of IaaS [215].
A firewall is a critical network access control mechanism, therefore it will be
discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. The above IaaS security challenges ana-
lysis shows that there are several security vulnerabilities occurring as a side effect
of the substantial IaaS characteristics. Figure 2.1 reveals that a proper design
and implementation of access control is a critical element that can contribute to
mitigating the majority of the security IaaS challenges.
2.3 Example of a Security Breach in IaaS
During LVMM Process
The IaaS layer consists of several components, such as virtualization, networking,
storage and processing. Virtualisation is one of the key components; furthermore,
the main core services in IaaS are Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and VM mi-
gration [41]. Security of the live virtual machine migration (LVMM) is considered
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Figure 2.2: LVMM Process Steps [204]
one of the major challenges in IaaS and a critical research topic [13, 41, 148, 222].
There is a default LVMM algorithm in most popular hypervisors, such as Xen,
VMWare and KVM [141]. A typical LVMM mechanism consists of four main
stages, as shown in Figure 2.2 , which start with several iterations that aim to
transfer VM memory pages from the source physical machine to the destination,
where a new location for VM has been selected.
The ideal migration process is to copy the complete state of the VM, including
memory, disk and network connection [141]. From a networking point of view,
there are two categories of LVMM: moving VMs belonging to the same sub-network
and moving VMs between different sub-networks. The latter requires a change
of IP address and introduces another challenge that limits migration in cloud
computing [208].
LVMM has been penetrated via man-in-the-middle attacks, as well as suc-
cessfully attacked by through flag migration [158, 218, 66]. LVMM introduces
important security issues because it includes VM state transfer through commu-
nication links, which can be attacked by ARP spoofing, DNS spoofing and route
Hijacking [172].
Live Virtual Machine Migration (LVMM) security vulnerabilities are related to
the security exposures in virtualisation technology [13, 91, 172, 190, 223, 235, 241].
The following illustrates LVMM vulnerabilities, which have been categorised into
three sources of threat, as follows:
 The first vulnerability is through the network link, as live migration involves
a lot of network state transfer. Encryption techniques can be involved in
mitigating this risk, but there should be a careful consideration of down-
time since LVMM runs in real time. IPsec has been used in some security
approaches to mitigate live migration threats, although it introduces a com-
putational delay [201, 194]. Moreover, encryption is not able completely to
mitigate this security hole [158].
 The second vulnerability is through the host (physical machine), where it
can be attacked or it can host an untrustworthy VM. As a consequence,
the migrated VM security can be compromised since it will be in a shared
environment with malicious components. Attacks can also be initiated in
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migrated VMs through the hypervisor if its corresponding host has been
successfully compromised.
 The third vulnerability is based on security configuration consistency and
efficiency. This is as a result of the different natures of physical appliances
and virtual appliances, such as a firewall. This vulnerability occurs due to
various factors, such as firewall placement and the policy configurations [228].
Moreover, elasticity introduces security flaws caused by misconfiguration
after a migration is triggered [105]. Network state consistency can also be
affected after migration where some network packets might be lost during
LVMM downtime [130].
To sum up, LVMM main security issues arise as a consequence of an environ-
ment shared between different customers (cloud users), which is a multi-tenancy
feature of IaaS, as well as dynamicity and elasticity features which raise the need
to update access control policies as the virtual machine changes its location. We
can conclude that LVMM security is a critical issue in IaaS and it faces serious
security challenges that need to be addressed and considered as an open research
topic.
There is a trend to secure LVMM through vTPM [58]. Nevertheless, TPM-
based measurements are ineffective for detecting a malicious cloud service provider
as well as having limitations in verifying the hypervisor integrity in public clouds
via remote attestation [33]. To secure LVMM, there is a need to design an access
control policy that allows the administrator to manage migration privileges. The
existing access control model in IaaS should be upgraded to cope with the emerging
security challenges [158]. Similarly, existing firewall approaches should be modified
to meet IaaS characteristics.
2.4 IaaS Firewall System
IaaS dynamicity and rapid infrastructure changes, due to adding and removing
virtual machines and virtual machine migration, introduce a challenge to the fire-
wall as there is a need to update firewall entries frequently. This leads to increasing
maintenance overheads as firewall policies need to be updated in such large scale
environment [173]. If the firewall is not well constructed, managed and updated,
the IaaS will be at risk, resulting in facilitating for hackers the access to the cloud
interface on behalf of legitimate users [33, 60].
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2.4.1 Security Group Approach
A firewall system is a critical network access control enforcement mechanism in
most computing environments. A cloud service provider (CSP) provides firewall
functionality in the form of a security group. For example, Amazon, Windows
Azure and OpenStack implement the concept of the security group to provide a
firewalling service to their customers.
In general, security groups are set to deny everything by default and individual
services must be enabled by the client. The security group allows customers to
restrict traffic to and from their VMs. All VMs which belong to the same security
group will have the same firewall policy [100]. This makes a cloud firewall service
relatively user-friendly, but it lacks many of the features commonly found on
local firewall products [54]. The security groups alone are insufficient to prevent
attackers from communicating with the external network [126].
There are two methods of setting up firewall policy through security group:
either to create an entry for each VM in the security group or to group VMs in
one entry based on their IP prefix. The first method faces scalability limitations
in IaaS, while the second method complicates VM address management [173].
Therefore, cloud can bring some potential security threats to the organisation by
not having an organisation specific firewall [132].
2.4.2 IaaS Firewall Security Threats and Limitations
As IaaS provides several features that introduce flexibility into the cloud infra-
structure, it initiates complexity in firewall configuration and installation. Due to
the large scale of IaaS infrastructure, a simple policy can lead to a large number
of fine-grained rules [147].
The effectiveness of firewall security depends on its policies. However, firewall
policies are often error prone due to the complex nature of firewall configura-
tions as well as the lack of systematic analysis mechanisms and tools [95]. In
a distributed environment, detecting anomalies in firewalls has become a com-
plex task [79]. According to an empirical study of middle-box failures over two
years in a service provider network, it was found that firewalls crash more than
other security systems, such as IPDS and VPN, and that 33% of firewall failures
are due to misconfiguration, faulty failovers and software version mismatch [175].
Therefore, the firewall policy management area is an evolving research field, as
policy correctness and consistency among firewall systems is an essential element
for enhancing firewall security [64, 184]. To get a cloud firewall policy configura-
tion pattern, intensive experiments are needed to make security policy complete
[124].Therefore, several researchers are concerned with improving firewall policy
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Figure 2.3: IaaS firewall limitations
strategy; for example, the Tree-Rule firewall, which uses the NF-IP-FORWARD
algorithm to improve the performance of firewalls in cloud policy configurations
[92].
Another problem with firewalls in cloud computing is their placement; too few
firewalls can cause a large number of communication flows. The placement of
firewalls in cloud computing is critical in maximising the security benefits they
offer. Traditional firewall placement is not sufficient in cloud computing, as it
will introduce traffic overhead to the network switches and hypervisors [147].A
major network security risk in cloud computing is due to the limits of traditional
firewall connections [71]. Traditional firewall settings are not sufficient for op-
timal fine-grained decisions and application-level as they are not able to deal with
dynamically opened server ports for encrypted connections [226].
Several researchers consider firewalls and VLAN to be less effective in the cloud
environment, due to several challenges such as time consuming in configuration
and management, limitation of the geographic zones, limitation to the number
of users and static nature [130, 155, 173, 215].The firewalls can be breached in
cloud environments by a mechanism using UDP coordinating with TCP [133].
An analytical experiment shows that there is a time interval where LVMM is not
under firewall protection. A firewall cannot differentiate normal traffic from attack
traffic if it accesses the network through port 80 [146]. Moreover, 42% of firewall
failures are due to DDoS attack at the network layer [175]. Traditional packet-
level firewall mechanisms are not suitable for cloud platforms in cases of complex
attacks [232].
The limitations of firewall configuration in cloud computing according to this
investigation are summarised in Figure 2.3. We can notice that traditional access
control enforcement mechanisms are not sufficient in cloud computing. Therefore,
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there is a need to redesign a firewall system that suits IaaS characteristics.
2.4.3 Firewall Approaches in IaaS
Cloud users, such as companies and governments, might not rely on cloud-based
firewalling approaches as these approaches still experience severe performance and
reliability issues [87].Ensuring network security in the current complex infrastruc-
ture which involves different vendors and cloud service providers (CSP) turns out
to be difficult and time-consuming. Each CSP has their own API to manage the
security mechanisms, such as traditional firewalls, virtual firewalls and security
tools. Therefore, what looks like a simple application change may require tens or
even hundreds of configurations [90].
As shown by Table 2.1 , IaaS firewall approaches from the literature agree that
the traditional firewall needs to be improved or replaced in order to cope with
the IaaS environment. A trend of deploying virtual firewall is illustrated in most
of the approaches. Firewall virtualisation allows dynamic deployment, so it suits
IaaS characteristics and it can effectively improve firewall configuration [87, 224].
Most of the academic research assumes that the insiders in cloud service pro-
viders are not trusted [100, 132, 210]. To improve the trust in the cloud environ-
ment, a bridge virtual firewall can be designed and installed on the virtual machine
in IaaS so that the cloud user can have full control on their firewall [132]. A bridge
firewall improves the performance, but it limits the security of the live migration as
this type of firewall cannot manage different types of policies. Moreover, massive
attacks may compromise a virtual firewall if they originate from outside the virtual
domain [87].The virtual firewall side effect can be mitigated if a proper firewall is
designed among virtual machines and suitable firewall policies are defined [124].
Table 2.1 indicates the two approaches discussed regarding firewall systems
administration in IaaS, which are centralised and distributed. The centralised
approach was found to be less prone to misconfiguration failure as it monitored
continually [175]. On the other hand, it has several drawbacks: it may lead the
centralised controller to reach a bottleneck, it attracts more DDoS attacks and
can introduce a single point of failure [173]. The centralised firewall set-up is
argued to be unfeasible in the cloud due to performance and cost issues [129]. The
distributed approach is used by many enterprises on the network edge [147]. To
handle dynamic policy update in IaaS, a distributed firewall needs a complicated
revocation and re-propagation mechanism [96].
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Table 2.1: Firewall approaches in dynamic network
Ref Main Problem Proposed Solution Admin
Type
[173] Conventional network
access contorl: firewall
and VLAN face several
limitation in IaaS
Take the policy enforce-
ment point out from the
network and place it into
the hypervisor
Centralised
[96] Network states and
traffic are frequently
changed
Firewall Framework to
cope up with SDN en-
virnomnt
Centralised
[147] fine-grained rules are
needed by CSP to get
better control over
individual network flows
For better scalability
and performance, place
the access control policy
on both hypervisor and
switch
Centralised
[87] Cloud firewalling suffers
from performance and re-
liability issues
Propose a framework
consisting of phyical
firewall and virtual
firewall
Centralised
[232] Packet level firewall
mechanisism can not
handle a complex attack
on the cloud
Cloud firewall framework
involves event level de-
tection chain with dy-
namic resource allocation
Not men-
tioned
[210] Network topology is not
well defined, insiders are
not trusted. Policies
in Conventional firewalls
are static and can not ad-
apt to real-time threats
Propose a distributed
firewall with a distrib-
uted active response by
moving policy enforce-
ment point from network
firewall to end host
Distributed
[132] CSP is not fully trusted Propose a firewall system
monitored by the cloud
customers
Distributed
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2.5 Access Control Model
Authentication, access control, and audit together provide the foundation for in-
formation and system security. Consequently, access control is applied after au-
thentication has been established [189]. In cloud computing, the authentication
technique is fulfilled through identity management that supports access control
based on user attributes [212]. Vaquero studied several virtualised (multitenant)
datacentres and concluded that most reported systems employed access control
techniques to secure their environment [215].
As has been discussed in IaaS security challenges in Section 2.2, it was found
that an appropriate access control mechanism is needed to mitigate most of the
explored threats. Unfortunately, the classical access control models such as man-
datory, discretionary and role-based are not suitable for IaaS due to its character-
istics [19, 110, 145]. Several attributes should be taken into consideration to set
up proper access control for the cloud environment [103, 137, 173]. These are:
 The method of access to the cloud and cloud architecture. The users in
the cloud are identified by their attributes or their characteristics, not by
fixed IP address. Therefore, a dynamic access control is needed to achieve
cross-domain authentication. The cloud access control should be network
independence.
 The multi-tenancy feature in IaaS requires flexibility in seating access policy
as different users are sharing the same infrastructure, although they are most
probably not from the same organisation or country.
2.5.1 Background and Challenges
As a general principle, an access-control model aims to protect objects from un-
authorised subjects based on a specific access control policy. Authorisation means
that an authenticated subject is allowed to perform an operation on an object.
Each access-control policy has a model that it follows. Each access-control model
consists of a well-defined framework and a set of boundaries that describes the
relations used to combine the objects, the subjects, the operations and access
rules in order to generate an access-control decision. There are four main access
control models: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control
(MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC). Several research scholars have described these access control model's
properties and their limitations [10, 20, 94, 109, 113, 125, 137, 138, 189, 233, 236].
Access-control models can be categorised based on the main entity that is in-
volved in the creation of the access policy rules. For example, the entities can
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be the subject or the object. Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) categories,
such as DAC and RBAC, face scalability challenges in a large system since they
are based on the subject identity. Moreover, they are cumbersome and lack the
ability to adopt dynamic policy changes. DAC has two main limitations: the first
limitation relates to delegation issues since its read access is granted transitively.
The second limitation is due to its access structure concept being dependant on
subject identification. Therefore, it allows the program to inherit the identity of
the invoking user, which is considered a security vulnerability. RBAC has been
standardised and used widely in most economical computing systems [76]. Its role
is considered as a link between users and permissions in order to permit or deny
access [47]. RBAC faces several limitations, such as role expansion in dynamic
systems. It is static as its access rules must be pre-defined before the system
is running [59, 94]. Lattice-based access control categories, such as Mandatory
Access Control (MAC), are centralised models where the security administrator
assigns fixed security labels to objects. MAC faces similar scalability challenges
to RBAC and DAC. The last access-control model category is based on system
attributes such as Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC). It controls access by
evaluating rules against the attributes of several elements, including the entities
(subject and object), the operations, and the environment. It is the most suit-
able candidate for the IaaS access control model because ABAC is scalable and
supports a dynamic environment.
The challenges facing the design and implementation of the access-control sys-
tem are as follows [21, 89, 94]:
 It is a complex system that is divided into three layers: policy, model, and
mechanism. The interaction and the relation between these is sophisticated
 Translating the business policy to the access control rule set is a complex
process. It requires an expressive tool such as formal logic that is able to
specify the policy statements into rules that can be computed by machines
 There is no perfect access-control model that will fit all types of comput-
ing systems. Each access control model involves a trade-off and limitations.
Therefore, the selection of the proper model is based on the system require-
ments and the business functions
 The access control state is safe if no permission can be taken by an unau-
thorised principal. The safety computation has been proven to encounter
an undecidable problem in traditional access control models such as access
matrix.
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Figure 2.4: Access Control building blocks as explained by [97]
Figure 2.5: Access Control building blocks as explained by [187]
In order to facilitate the process of designing and implementing the access con-
trol system, it has been divided into three layers: policy, model, and mechanism.
The definitions of these three building blocks are explained below [10, 21, 94, 98,
104, 186, 187].
Access Control Policy.To distinguish the access-control policy from other
usages of the term 'policy', it is defined as a specification of the system behaviour
[16]. This will produce a set of Allow/Deny rules that reflect the business owner's
objectives and security policies.
Access Control Model. This is an intermediate layer between the higher
level, which is the policy, and the lower level, which is the mechanism. In some
cases, the policy is implemented directly into the mechanism without formally
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defining the access-control model if the policy is application-specific and imple-
mented by a particular vendor. However, in cases where the access-control policy
spans multiple computing platforms or consists of several security factors, there is
a necessity to formally define an access-control model. Mainly, the model specifies
how the policy can be implemented and enforced via the access-control mechanism.
Access Control Mechanism. This involves functions that implement the
control obligated by the access-control policy stated in the model. It can be
written in the form of pseudocode which can be implemented in a hardware layer
or a software layer by using a programming language.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the access control building blocks by [97]. The policy re-
flects the protection concepts where the model can formally be specified. However,
Figure 2.5 bring the term policy model which can be formally specified by [187].
In [206], Tang used the term Policy to refer to his proposed ABAC enhancement
for multi-tenant IaaS where the term Enforcement model was used to refer to his
proposed framework. It was found that the term 'access-control policy'is used
interchangeably with the term 'access-control model'. However, it is common to
refer to RBAC, ABAC, DAC and MAC as access control models instead of access
control policies as Figure 2.6 shows results from Google scholar.
Figure 2.6: Google Scholar Results for the keywords Model vs. Policy for Access
Control Types
It can be concluded that the term 'policy'is used to describe the architecture
that is followed to create access rules, where the term 'model'refers to the formal
specifications that are used to express the access control system properties. The
access-control models: MAC, DAC, RBAC and ABAC are occasionally referred
to as policies since they indicate how the access rules are created. MAC rules are
based on object-labelling. DAC rules are based on subject-identity. RBAC rules
are based on subject-roles. ABAC rules are based on attributes. This research
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will refer to them as 'access control models'to avoid ambiguity, and will use the
term 'policy'when discussing authorisation rules.
2.5.2 Access Control Models Approaches in IaaS
Several access control models are proposed in the literature which address various
access control problems in IaaS. Table 2.2 summarises IaaS cloud access-control
models which have been published recently. The most common limitation found
among them is the performance overhead, which leads to an increase in computa-
tional cost that affects QoS (Quality of Service). The access control policies and
models presented by Nguyen and Tang [152, 206] use RBAC and ABAC as a basis
for their proposed models. Their architectures are implemented via XACML and
provide a proof of concept via OpenStack.
Table 2.2: Recent proposed Access Control Models for IaaS
Ref. Access Control requirement Proposed solution Used tools
[152] expressive and fine-
grained access control
as prior models are
not suitable
PBAC (Provenance-
based Access Control)
a sub-set of ABAC
XACML and
OpenStack
[206] a fine-grained access
control model for
multi-tenant collabor-
ation
Multi-Tenant Role-
Based Access Control
(MT-RBAC)
XACML and
OpenStack
[1] support multi-tenant
hosting and hetero-
geneity of security
policies, rules and
domains
Access Control model
for Cloud Computing
(AC3)
theoretical
[14] manage access from
users or entity that be-
long to different au-
thorization domains
Capability-based Ac-
cess Control
theoretical
[122] flexible and fine-
grained access control
for VM-level
IaaS-oriented Hy-
brid Access Control
(iHAC)
iVIC as IaaS
continued on next page
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Ref. Access Control requirement Proposed solution Used tools
[123] a user-centric access
control for mobile
Cloud environments
Context-Aware
Attribute-Based
Techniques
XACML
[239] balance between in-
formation security
and resource sharing
hierarchical secure
information and re-
source sharing model
OpenStack
[27] virtual resources in
IaaS are configured
using software, and
hence prone to mis-
configurations
attribute-based con-
straints specification
and enforcement
OpenStack
[150] Multi-tenant ac-
cess control is not
supported
ABAC that support
multi-tenant access
OpenStack
[134] centralized access me-
diation and flexible
policy customization
least-invasive access
control framework
OpenStack
[22] The relation between
users and resources in
cloud computing is ad
hoc and dynamic
Extend RBAC with
trust relation
CloudSim in
Planet Lab
The proposed model by A. Younis et al and Anggorojati et al [1, 14] presents
a great work regarding security policy design based on attributes, but it does not
present a security model architecture. The proposed model and the enforcement
implementation presented by Li et al [122] is remarkable, as it does not consider IP
address as the main attribute in the access-control policy, instead it uses security
type.
However, their model does incur a performance overhead. A concentration
on multi-tenant access-control is investigated by Ngo et al [150] and an ABAC
model is proposed to cope with this feature. A cloud user-centric access control
model is proposed by Li [123] which targets customer privacy within mobile cloud
applications rather than IaaS cloud. Luo et al in [134] investigate the improvement
of access control models in an OpenStack IaaS cloud. RBAC is still used in most
cloud computing, Behera and Khilarin in [22] extend it with a trust-relation.
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Figure 2.7: Unified ABAC Model Structure [108]
2.6 Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
The definition of Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) in this section is extra-
polated based on the knowledge obtained from various ABAC references such as
[52, 98, 221].
Attribute is the base element in calculating the access decision in ABAC models
as illistrated in Figure 2.7. UA is the user attributes, SA is the subject attrib-
utes and OA is the object attributes. Attribute is defined as a pair of (name:
value), where value can be a complex data structure. They can be associated
with different entities such as users, actions, subjects, objects, context and envir-
onment. Policy rules convert the combination of attributes into access rights in
real-time. Therefore, the permissions in ABAC are not listed beforehand. The use
of predefined attributes instead of predefined permissions in decision making adds
flexibility to the access-control system. For example, in RBAC, the permission
engineering process requires the grouping of permissions into roles; users are then
assigned to these roles. However, as the system scales up, these processes become
more complex and face a roles-explosions problem [98].
One of the critical differences between ABAC and previous access control mod-
els is that ABAC access decisions are not associated with user-identity, making
ABAC dynamic and able to cope with changes. Therefore, if the system ad-
ministrator intends to update access control policy, the only place which must be
changed is the policy-rules file. In contrast, it is difficult to determine which places
need to be updated in identity-bounded models such as ACL (Access Control List)
which is used with DAC and RBAC models.
This thesis defines ABAC as follows: ABAC generates its access control de-
cision based on a collection of attributes driven from the involved entities in the
access-request and the system environment. Attributes enable the ABAC model
to be fine-grained, flexible and able to express a complex Boolean rule-set. ABAC
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supports a real-time access-decisions and a dynamic access control system since it
is identity-free based.
2.6.1 Background and Challenges
ABACα is described in the literature as a foundation of the ABAC model's func-
tionality. Therefore, it is essential to identify ABACα limitations so as to be
able to propose enhancements to ABAC. The list of challenges is stated below
[108, 118, 192, 193]:
 ABACα focuses on the ABAC basic with minimal features. It does not take
into consideration the object and the subject hierarchies
 It does not involve environment and context attributes
 It does not formally express the fundamental access-control security prin-
ciples such as separation of duty (SoD)
 It does not take into consideration the delegation feature
 It is considered as one of the first contributions in formalising the ABAC
model, however, the policy language used is insufficient for real-world ap-
plications such as handling multiple policy compositions or policy conflict
 The authors in [195] present ABACα in OWL. Their investigation concludes
that ABACα does not cover static or dynamic separation of duty principles
nor does the subject involve an attribute that reflects its contextual inform-
ation
More precisely, the ABACα author recommendations are as follows:
 The proposed Common Policy Language (CPL) is not a complete language as
it does not specify the values of the symbols set and atomic variable. These
two values have a significant effect on each configuration point. Therefore;
there is a need to investigate a policy language that is able to detect mis-
configuration and can present compliance with privacy expectations
 Attribute engineering might add complexity to ABAC. In addition to the
difficulty in policy expression and comprehension due to the policy config-
uration point proliferation
It can be deduced that ABAC challenges are two-fold: The first is related to
its conceptual definition and the second is related to its formal definition. These
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two challenges are detected as well by [118, 188, 193]. The conceptual definition
includes the features supported by the ABAC model, such as the separation of
duty security principle and the context aware mechanism. The formal definition
includes a formal language that is able to formally specify ABAC model properties.
The use of formal logic in the design of ABAC policy rules is a convenient ap-
proach for two distinct reasons [30]. The first being that formal logic is straight-
forward since it does not have an up-front cost, unlike RBAC role engineering.
The second reason is that formal logic is flexible, since its attributes facilitate
the expression of complex policy rules.One of the earliest works related to the
logical based framework for ABAC was carried out by Wang et al [221], using the
constraint logic programming language. Bijon et al in [28] developed a declar-
ative language for Attribute Based Constraint specification (ABCL). Hence, the
declarative language is specific since it focuses on specified constraint values of the
attributes held by the ABAC model. However, ABCL did not specify the values
of the attribute related to authorisation policy rules.
There are several policy specification languages, including SecPAL, DYNPAL,
SMP, Binder, SPKI/SDSI, XACML and EPAL. However, they all focus on specify-
ing and evaluating authorisation policy, and none present comprehensive formal
models for ABAC. Jin in [108] defined a template called Common Policy Language
(CPL), although it is not a complete language as the symbol set and atom are left
unspecified. There is an open research in policy specification languages related to
misconfiguration detection and privacy compliance [108]. Most of the logic-based
formalisations presented for ABAC lack the ability to manage attributes and en-
gineer security policy rules [118]. Considerable attention is given to improving
the use of XACML as a policy language for ABAC because it is compatible with
many web applications. However, XACML does face limitations related to policy
semantics [195, 200]. An Interesting work was carried out by Crampton & Willi-
ams in [53] regarding the completeness of the ABAC model using XACML formal
logic, where they introduce the use of three-valued policy in XACML.
The techniques used for the ABAC policy specification are either formal logic or
enumeration. Examples of the first category are ABACα, HGABAC and XACML.
Examples of the second category are Policy Machine (PM) and 2-sorted-RBAC
[30]. This study selects the formal logic technique for ABAC specification since
it allows the research to verify and reason ABAC. The Section 2.7 justifies the
selection of formal logic approch.
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2.6.2 ABAC in IaaS Cloud
The ABAC model concept is context-aware in the sense that it can utilise the
attributes concept in its authorisation decision. However, ABACα [108] does not
indicate the context-aware feature. Instead, the author contains some concepts of
context in his ABACβ which is designed for the purpose of unifying RBAC exten-
ded models. Smari et al [198] extended ABACα with context, privacy, and trust
features where context is involved in access-control policy beside subject and ob-
ject. Thus far, there is no illustration regarding system complexity evaluation nor
policy language formalisation. Servos and Osborn [192] proposes HGABAC where
the ABAC model takes into consideration hierarchal features. Servos & Osborn
used some context-awareness by involving the network-connection and environ-
ment attributes. However, they did not consider the separation of duty concept
or delegation feature. Their policy language is also based on Kleene K3 logic.
The formal languages used in ABACα and HGABAC are a type of propositional
logic. Therefore, they face the satisfiability problem of NP-complete during policy
update or policy review. Even if a formal language based on first-order logic is
used to express the ABAC policy, it will face an undecidable computational prob-
lem [30].The focus of this research is to specify the context-aware mechanism and
separation of duty security principle in ABAC model.
2.7 Access Control Model Formal Specification,
Verification and Reasoning
2.7.1 Formal Logic in Access Control
Access control is an essential and widely used security mechanism. One of the
critical challenges in implementing access control is its policy specification and
management. There is a limitation in the available tools that allow administrators
to mitigate this challenge. Therefore, policy misconfiguration is the cause of a huge
number of security breaches cases [106].
Based on the literature, access control specification can follow a graph-based
approach or logic-based method. The graph-based approach is used to represent
access control models. However, the logic-based method is more convenient when
it comes to reasoning and computing [24]. Logic-based access control models are
suited to large dynamic systems as they are expressive and able to represent a
variety of authorisation policies [93]. Using formal logic for specifying, reason-
ing and verifying access control systems is an active research area. The logical
approach is more appropriate for this access control research scope than calculus-
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based approaches since it allows the detection of patterns of correct or incorrect
reasoning [16, 47].
In early 1973, the status of logic in computer science was not clear, and its
usefulness was not identified because of a lack of mechanical testing to validate
predicate logic. Furthermore, Boolean logic is intractable. Classical logic was
established to provide a formal language to describe how mathematics works us-
ing proven methods [45]. Classical logic (also known as sentential logic), such as
propositional logic and predicate logic (also known as First Order Logic or FOL),
formulas are either true or false in any model. Non-classical logic such as modal
logic (also known as symbolic logic) differ from classical logic as they replace the
concept of truth, which consists of two values: true or false, with the concept of
constructive provability. The constructive provability operations preserve justific-
ations with respect to evidence and provability rather than truth value.
In natural language, there are various truth modes such as it is believed to
be true (doxastic logic), it is always held (temporal logic), it is known to be
true (epistemic logic), and it ought to be the case that it is true (deontic logic)
[102]. Therefore, modal logic is more appropriate to reason in a dynamic situation
where a truth value varies over time. On the other hand, classical logic has
a static neuter [219]. First order logic might be more expressive then modal
logic, but in term of validities, modal logic is decidable where first order logic is
undecidable. Therefore, modal logic strikes a balance between expressive power
and computational complexity [214]. Table 2.3 compare modal logic with classical
logic. [214] Modal logics tend to be decidable ; and their validities can be described
in transparent variable-free notations. Understanding the trade-off between the
expressive power and axiomatizability is essential in formal logic reasoning.
Table 2.3: Comparing Modal Logic with Classical Logic
Classical Logic Modal Logic
Value nature Static Dynamic
Value Range Either False or True Concept of constructive
provability
Based on Fixed Truth value Truth value varies over
time
Expressiveness More Less
Computation complex-
ity
Less More
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2.7.2 Decontic Logic (DL)
Modal logic extends the classical logic operators with modal operators that al-
low the representation of possibility and necessity [68]. Deontic logic is a type of
modal logic that involves operators such as obligations, prohibitions and permis-
sions. It is used in normative systems such as computer security, legal systems
and electronic commerce [39]. Information Systems (IS) store real-world data.
The property that exists in this world that is known to be true is called an integ-
rity constraint. Different logics can be used for normal (hard) constraints. On the
other hand, the exceptional (soft) constraints which are the desirable properties
can be violated. Therefore, there is a demand for a logic that is able to cap-
ture soft constraints such as deontic logic, because deontic logic has an advantage
of reasoning between the ideal and the actual behaviour [49]. Furthermore, de-
ontic logic supports formal languages in avoiding the ambiguity of access control
policy specifications and is consistent because its soundness and completeness are
achieved through its axiomatic characteristics. As a consequence, it supports an
access control implementation level [144].
Deontic logic receives a large degree of attention in the field of computer science
[6, 181]. Chevy & Cuppens [49] presents one of the earliest logical reasoning
approaches to the properties of security policy in access control based on deontic
logic. Furthermore, Glasgow et al in [85] propose a formal framework for specifying
and reasoning about security policies called Security Logic (SL), where deontic
logic had been involved in the formal language used. However, SL did not involve
any access control logic operators. An application of deontic logic in Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) is introduced by Koaczek [116]. Another work using
deontic logic in access control was presented by Abou El Kalam [5], where a
framework is proposed that can help the system administrator to automatically
derive the consequences of their policies.
2.7.3 Access Control Logic (ACL)
Several researchers contribute in defining and establishing Access Control Logic
(ACL). Chin and Older [47] use similar semantics to the logic of Abadi and his
colleagues, who have several contributions in this field such as [4, 2, 3, 120] and
their cooperation with Deepak [82, 81]. The ACL conducted by Abadi is con-
sidered as one of the foundations for ACL researchers. However, ACL has not
been used to formally define ABAC in the literature. Boella et al [34] proposes
a logical framework named Fibred Security Language (FSL). FSL aims to study
says operators. The FSL is based on a multi-modal logic methodology which uses
a fibring mechanism to combine logic based on the work of Gabbay [80].
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Several researchers have used intuitionistic logic to enhance ACL. Intuitionistic
logic is also known as constructive logic. Genovese et al [84] propose an ACL modal
(M-ACL) based on intuitionistic multimodal logic. M-ACL extends intuitionistic
propositional logic with says binary modality and speaks-for binary operator
between principles. Genovese et al prove the language soundness and completeness
using first order logic. Genovese et al in [83] present another modal called ACL+
for access control policy specification, reasoning, and enforcement to overcome
specific limitations of the basic ACL. These limitations are implicit permissions,
control or delegable permissions, and information flow versus acceptance. Massacci
[139] presents a logic for practical reasoning with RBAC based on Abadi ACL in
addition to a decision method based on analytic tableaux. Whereas Kosiyatrakul
[117] extends Abadi ACL, with four relations to reason about an RBAC policy
model.
2.8 Artificial Intelligence in IaaS Cloud
Security
To the best knowledge of the author, no prior work addresses the use of a knowledge-
agent in access control model implementation in IaaS. The knowledge-agent is a
type of logic-based agent; therefore, it suits systems where logic is used to infer a
decision. Thus, an attempt is made to involve this kind of agent in the current
research. There does exist, however, an inspiring work by Doelitzscher [62], who
proposes an auditing system for IaaS cloud using agent technology. There is a
research trend to employ computational intelligence in cloud computing [36] since
the cloud service provider can become a suitable candidate for offering security
intelligence [43]. Subsequently, in a frequently changing infrastructure, it will be
an advantage to deploy an agent-based mechanism [63]. A related work done by
[183] to address the use of Artificial Intelligence to mitigate the limitation of the
existing security mechanisms such as firewall in protecting cloud computing from
the dynamic nature of threats. The utilisation of artificial immune systems in
cloud security issues has been studied by [72]
2.9 Summary and Discussion
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is an approach to infrastructure outsourcing.
Its flexible characteristics add great benefits in deploying and managing resources
from a business perspective. On the other hand, IaaS infrastructure brings with
it several security challenges as it changes frequently, is shared among different
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customers, enables virtual machine configuration and allows a virtual machine to
move easily. As an example, for IaaS operations, live virtual machine migration
(LVMM) can be attacked through the network link or through the physical host
or even as a result of inconsistent policy configurations.
To mitigate these security challenges, a proper access control model and an
enforcement mechanism are essential to enhance IaaS security. In this paper, the
firewall as an access control enforcement mechanism is explored and the access
control models for cloud computing are investigated. Through this investigation,
it has been observed that the firewall faces several limitations in the cloud en-
vironment and even the firewall service offered by commercial clouds in form of
security group has limited functionalities.
The finding illustrates that cloud firewall system should offer flexibility to the
customer in addition to an acceptable level of trust. The virtual firewall as well
adds an advantage to IaaS if it is designed and implemented accurately to be
aligned with IaaS characteristics. The cloud firewall should also be built on a
suitable access control policy to alleviate the security challenges faced by IaaS.
The centralised and the distributed administration approaches for a firewall
system offer some useful gains alongside their limitations. We can point out that
the distributed administration approach for firewall looks to be more effective
than the centralized one in the IaaS environment.
Researchers have proposed several approaches to putting forward a cloud fire-
wall system. However, academic researchers recommend to take access control out
of the network and place it in the hypervisor, basically into the host [173, 210, 240].
Moreover, the traditional access control models are not adequate for imple-
mentation in the cloud environment. Researchers have proposed several cloud
access controls, but still some commercial clouds deploy a classic role-based access
control model. Therefore, it is recommended to perform a thorough exploration
on the proposed access control to come up with an improved model that is suitable
for IaaS and can attract the commercial cloud to deploy it.
We recommend employing an intelligence security approach in implementing
and monitoring the access control in IaaS to respond to the challenges faced by
traditional firewalls and access control models. Intelligence security is a fertile
approach, as most of the existing security paradigms suffer from reactive and
fragmented approaches [115]. The cloud service provider may become a con-
venient candidate for offering security intelligence [43]. In a frequently changing
infrastructure, it will be an advantage to deploy an agent-based mechanism [63].
Chapter 3
The Enhanced Attribute-Based
Access Control ABACsh
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the attribute-based access control enhancement in ABACsh,
with a focus on the context-aware mechanism (Section 3.2) and the SoD principle
(Section 3.3). This chapter concludes with a computational complexity and quality
metrics evaluation of ABACsh.
3.2 Context-Awareness Mechanism
3.2.1 Overview
The specifications of the context-aware system can be interpreted differently based
on the way researchers define a context within their study scope. In [112], context-
aware based access control allows dynamic grants for permissions to access objects
based on the current user context. The context of the subject and the object can
be extracted from the environment by using 5W1H (who, where, what, why, when
and how) [111]. In [108], context is considered as a finite set which reflects the
system-dependent attributes set by the administrator and differs from the subject
attributes and object attributes. However, other authors consider Attribute-Based
Access Control (ABAC) to support context-aware features as its access enforce-
ment is based on the attributes of the subject and the attributes of the objects
which reflect their context [44]. A context-aware investigation from the literature
is explored in the following section and analysed.
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3.2.2 Analytical Study of Context-Aware in ABAC
Kim's work [112] investigated context-aware access control of an ubiquitous applic-
ation with RBAC extension by involving a context-aware agent and state checking
matrix. The context-awareness is enforced via two cases. Firstly, the user privilege
should change based on the user context, such as location and time. Secondly, the
resource permissions changed based on the system information, such as network
bandwidth and memory usage. Kim proposed another work related to context-
aware access control [111] by presenting a new access control model called CIAAC
(Context Information-based Application Access Control), which was designed to
separate context awareness and access control policy from processing logic and
business, where context is defined as all the information surrounding an entity.
CIAAC allows flexible business application operation related to the changes in ac-
cess control policy to meet external security environment requirements. However,
its potential drawbacks have not yet been evaluated. Li proposed in his thesis
context-aware attribute-based techniques for data security and access control in
mobile cloud environment [123]. Context-aware terminology in his work involves
the surrounding context-information of a user as well as location and time. His
work is based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) and presents new user-centric
access control technique tailored to mobile cloud environments.
The research in this thesis does not consider encryption techniques as ABE
faces several limitations. ABE lack an efficient mechanism to support a complete
set of comparison relations in policy specification, as authorisation can be com-
plex and attributes can be multi-dimensional [148]. ABE also introduce a heavy
computation overhead caused by bilinear pairing, and cannot achieve fine-grained
access control [229]. AL Kukhun [7] presents an adaptive situation and context-
aware access in pervasive systems. Her proposed model is based on RBAC and
makes use of XACML language. There are several attempts to extend RBAC to
adopt context-aware features, but these approaches do not take into consideration
usability, situation awareness, and improving access opportunities. AL Kukhun
discusses several context-aware definitions which can be summarised as a sub-set
of conceptual states or information that can be used to characterise the interest or
situation of a particular entity. It can be observed that location and time are used
as context-aware parameters in most related work on context-aware access con-
trol models. Lie and Wang [131] present the Fine-grained Context-aware Access
(FCAC) model for Health Care and Life Sciences (HCLS) using specific communic-
ation technology based on linked data. FCAC is based on two main components:
an ontology base, and access policy with XACML. The researchers defined context
attributes as environmental attributes such as network location and time which are
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not related to the subject-attributes or object-attributes. Venkatasubramanian et
al [217] distinguishes between context-aware based on the traditional authorisation
models and their proposed criticality-aware based authorisation model. Based on
their investigation, the traditional context-aware definition looks only at the sub-
ject contextual information, whereas their proposed criticality-based model takes
the contextual information about the components of the whole system, not just
the subject. The proposed Criticality Aware Access Control (CAAC) is based on
RBAC concepts. CAAC evaluates the system context attributes continuously to
determine if they have deviated from the norm, and the user privileges are up-
dated before they trigger an access-request. Choi [48] proposes an ontology-based
Access Control Model (onto-ACM) that takes context-awareness into considera-
tion. Compared to C-RBAC (Context-aware RBAC), onto-ACM can grant the
role inheritance by administrator and user, whereas C-RBAC grants the role by
administrator only. Onto-ACM aims to use access-aware technology within a cloud
computing environment.
3.2.3 Context-Aware Deployment in IaaS by ABACsh
From prior investigation into the context-aware definition of access control, it
can be concluded that the context attributes are those attributes which affect
the decision calculation and are not related to the object or subject attributes.
As ABAC is the basic conceptual policy selected for IaaS, the entities context is
inherited in the form of attributes. Therefore, there is a need to define context-
awareness within ABAC.
Context-awareness in our proposed ABACsh model is deployed in two phases.
The first phase defines the context-attribute set. Each context-attribute consists
of an attribute name and an attribute value. The context attributes-names set is
predefined by the system administrator based on system critical information and
characteristics. Context-attributes differ from the environment attributes in that
the latter values are predefined by the administrator, whereas context-attribute
values are updated based on the system states, where an embedded sensor captures
the context information. For example, for the context-aware attribute named
memory, its value will be updated based on the system memory measurements.
The context attribute can reflect CPU clock, desk space, network zone, or data
and time. In the second phase, context-awareness will be defined as one of the
configuration points in the proposed ABACsh system to enforce the use of context
in the access-control decision.
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3.3 Separation of Duty (SoD) Principle
3.3.1 Overview
In an environment that allows policy combination, a user is authorised to act in
more than one role or trigger more than one operation simultaneously. Policy com-
bination might lead to policy conflict, as some actions violate the overall policy if
they are committed at the same time. Therefore, constraints should be configured
to manage this possibility.
The Separation of Duty (SoD) principle is used in such scenarios to prevent
misuse of the system by limiting the user to the least privilege necessary to perform
their required tasks. The least privilege principle limits the access of the subject
during an operation on a specific task to be within the minimum resources, lowest
privileges, and specified period of time. Several security enhancements can be
gained from SoD, such as fraud prevention and error minimisation [35, 119, 220].
There are two main types of SoD: static, and dynamic. Static-SoD (SSoD)
will list the conflicting roles which cannot be executed by the same user at the
same time, whereas dynamic-SoD (DSoD) enforces the control at the time of
access-request. In an RBAC model, roles and role relations are defined in advance
during the policy engineering process. For SSoD in RBAC, SSoD relations place
constraints on the user-to-rule assignment function, where one user can be assigned
a specific set of roles and be excluded from another set of roles. Otherwise, two
or more users are required to be involved in accomplishing sensitive tasks, since it
is less likely that multiple parties will issue a fraud attack. In the DSoD relation,
the capabilities for one user are restricted to being activated during a specific user
session, i.e. the same user cannot perform two roles simultaneously [76, 153].
Although in RBAC, SSoD and DSoD relations offer some advancement in con-
trol over identity-based systems, security issues remain. The most accommodating
form of SoD is History based (HSoD). Although, enforcing it in a static based ac-
cess control management environment such as RBAC is difficult, if not impossible
[74, 196]. One role of a HSoD is that it prevents an object from being accessed by
the same subject a certain number of times [94]. Therefore, we assume that the
ABAC model concept has the characteristics of supporting certain types of SoD.
The following section will investigate efforts in the literature to involve the SoD
principle in ABAC.
3.3.2 Analytical Study of SoD in ABAC
A significant amount of research has been conducted regarding the principle of
Separation of Duty (SoD) in RBAC; however, SoD deployment in ABAC remains
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a problem [193]. One of the earliest related works in specifying constraints in
ABAC is illustrated through ABACα configuration-points [108]. Nevertheless,
their proposed constraint settings are event-specific during attribute assignment
and/or modification of the object and subject. This method is similar to the
RBAC constraints-setting concept, where the allowed roles are activated for a
specific user session after the roles are assigned to the users.
The author of ABCL proposed an event-independent constraint language based
on conflicting relations of attribute values such as mutual exclusion and precondi-
tion [29]. ABCL language specifies restrictions either on a single set of attribute
values or on a set of values of different attributes within the same entity. The
usefulness of ABCL language has been validated through case studies. However,
it lacks a framework or a formal model that illustrates its implementation.
Dynamic Separation of Duties (DSoD) is more appropriate to cloud computing,
and it also meets the dynamic nature of ABAC. Nguyen [152] has carried out in-
teresting research on DSoD and proposed DSoD deployment through Provenance-
based Access Control (PBAC). His work is basically proposing a means to capture
and utilise the information needed in the SoD enforcement, as previous work in
the area assumes that the information is ready without demonstrating how to
prepare it. Some of the previous work related to dynamic-based SoD is ObjDSoD,
which is based on the object, and where the enforcement is constructed on a set
consisting of conflicting-roles and a conflicting-action on these roles. Therefore,
the subject will not be allowed to perform an action on an object if that action is
in the set of action role conflict. Another approach is OpsDSoD based on opera-
tions. This is a task-aware that involves an action-role conflict set, thus it differs
from ObjDSoD by limiting the user to perform the needed actions for a particle
task even though they have more privileges. A third approach is HDSoD, which
combines ObjDSoD and OpsDSoD. Further, HDSoD is object-aware and a task-
aware. HDSoD is order-aware, where order-dependency conflict is triggered if the
order is essential for a sequence of sub-tasks. Nguyen in [152] extended HDSoD
by adding dependence-path-aware and past attribute-aware in their DSoD which
is used in Provenance-based Access Control (PBAC).
Event pattern and response relations called obligations are introduced by Fer-
raiolo, Atluri, and Gavrila in their policy machine research [74], which can enforce
some forms of HSoD in their access control framework. Obligations have a set of
conditions that are specified by the event pattern under which the state of the
policy is obligated to change; only if this set matches the surrounding context,
the operation on an object can be executed. There are two recognised standards
can be applied to the ABAC concept: Extensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML), and Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) [75]. XACML
CHAPTER 3. THE PROPOSED MODEL:ABACSH 36
does not show any support for DSoD constraint, while NGAC does show some
support to DSoD through a Prohibitions (Denies)-relation, which includes a set
of denying relations that specify privilege exceptions where a user that is allowed
to run capability (x) will be prohibited from running capability (y).
3.3.3 SoD Design and Deployment in Access Control
System
It is most likely that the formulation of SoD requirements are prepared by the
administrator based on the business rules. An example of such a rule is, person
may not approve his or her own purchase order [35]. SoD deployment can be
involved with different layers of an access control system. It can be designed
within administrative-level policies and procedures, or it can be used within logical
or technical mechanism access-control restriction points [119].
Based on recommendations regarding SoD implementation to traverse its lim-
itation in RBAC [196], several techniques have been explored, such as grouping
concept, membership control, activation control, history control, and labels. How-
ever, in ABAC, the grouping concept will not be appropriate as grouping restricts
an attributes flexible nature. Membership control cannot be adopted by ABAC
as it is not role-centric. Though, the activation control concept has been adop-
ted into SoD specifications in ABAC by Jin [108] and Bijon [29]. Ferraiolo et al
[74] describe a relation between entities that can be used in History based SoD
deployment. Whereas Biswas et al [30] point out that label concept can be used
to enforce SoD in their proposed label-based access control in an ABAC.
There are several obstacles in designing and implementing SoD, as it is an
application-oriented policy where the business rules indicate the critical tasks
which require SoD enforcement. Another challenge is that different applications
may require various types of SoD. Lastly, most SoD types are informally defined,
which creates ambiguity regarding the subjects or specifications [86].
3.3.4 SoD Deployment in IaaS by ABACsh
Based on the above investigation [29, 107, 152, 193], SoD can be defined as an
enforcement constraint configured to avoid conflict between policies. This conflict
can be due to multi-access requests from different subjects to the same resource
simultaneously, or the same subject requesting access to multiple resources at the
same time. From this definition, it can be observed that SoD may be viewed as
object-operation-oriented, which can be aligned with ABAC's relation between
object-attributes and operations. We can discern from the above that it is more
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appropriate to enhance SoD by implementing a form of HSoD which will be suit-
able to be enforced in a dynamic access control policy environment such as ABAC.
With RBAC, the centric entity involved in the SoD principle design is the role
set. In contrast, ABAC cannot consider a role in the form of an attribute as it can
lead to a chaos [52]. Therefore, the focus of this paper regarding formally defining
SoD within ABAC will be on attributes and attribute-relations, with no aim to
define an application-oriented SoD. Thus, we aim to identify a logical based design
for SoD within the ABAC policy model. The proposed work is based on formal
logic; exception cases are not encouraged in a formal logic as exceptions make
regulations non-monotonic and introduce conflict between proven conclusions [61].
Therefore, the proposed SoD is operation-object orientated that defines a rules-set
reflecting the forbidden operations on the set of objects under a specific situation
of a collection of entities attributes. Entities include the object, the subject, the
environment, and the system context. Moreover, formal logic facilitates SoD rule
creation, even by non-expert security administrators. Since the proposed system
is attribute-based, it is not necessary to update different locations if a new action-
restriction is added, deleted, or modified.
3.4 Evaluating ABACsh Computational
Complexity and Quality Metrics
3.4.1 Overview
Computational complexity theory studies the resources required to solve a given
computing problem. This study can look at the time or/and the space require-
ments in order to study the system behaviour. Computational complexity of an
algorithm can be measured by determining their computation duration and the
memory consumption. This task can be accomplished through two approaches.
The first is benchmarking which measures the duration in seconds and memory
in bytes for a particular system implementation and input. The second is a math-
ematical analysis of algorithms which use asymptotic analysis through O() nota-
tion. In contrast to benchmarking, it is independent of the system implementation
as different systems can be written in different programming languages, running
on different computer specifications, and using different compilers and data-set.
Therefore, benchmarking results is difficult to predicate how well the algorithm
performs in a different system. In this research, we use O() notation approach
because it balances between precision and ease of analysis. [182, 180]
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3.4.2 Evaluation Results
The performance of access control enforcement is crucial for a system that has
a large number of users, such as cloud computing. Computational complexity
calculations provide an insight to measure performance by including the number
of required operations in granting access decisions and safety checks. The existing
access control model based on RBAC introduce a high time complexity and colossal
space complexity process [211].
This section investigates the computational complexity of three ABAC mod-
els: the proposed ABACsh, the basic ABAC presented by ABACα [108], and the
hierarchical ABAC presented by HGABAC [192]. The two primary operations of
ABAC models are attribute assignment and policy creation. The safety check is
an add-on feature which enhances the access control system. Table 3.1 demon-
strates the complexity evaluation between these three ABAC models. Attributes
assignment in ABACsh is based on the attributes function Att(), which returns the
attributes of the required entity. Therefore, it can be represented as a constant
function in terms of O-notation, which is also applicable in ABACα. The constant
function in terms of O-notation written as O(1). On the other hand, HGABAC
has a group assignment in addition to the attributes assignment because it ad-
opted a hierarchical approach. However, it affects the performance based on the
cases implemented, as illustrated by the HGABAC authors in their case-based
evolution. In O-notation, HGABAC is represented as (O(N .M)) where N rep-
resents the attributes assignment and M the group assignment. The hierarchy
feature is known in RBAC as role-hierarchy which allow an inheritance relation
between roles. When a user is assigned to a role, s/he is indirectly associated with
the junior-role capabilities. On the other hand, rule hierarchies in ABAC are to
add attributes hierarchy to subject and object by adding two type of assignment
relations. Subject-attribute to subject-attribute assignment and object-attribute
to object-attribute assignment. The advantage of hierarchy is to add attributes
Inheritance benefits. That results to fewer rules and reduce relations of the ob-
ject to object-attribute and subject to subject-attribute [73]. Hierarchy Grouping
attribute-based access control (HGABAC) is proposed by [192] with an aim to be
able to express DAC, MAC and RBAC. The hierarchy is out of this research scope
at this point.
Regarding safety check, only ABACsh supports SoD. The complexity of this
operation is inO(n) in which SoD rules are consist of (n) forbidden rules. The time
for this operation will increase proportionally as there will be a loop of size (n).
Moreover, ABACα does not provide a logic for policy creation where HGABAC
employees truth table schema via K3 logic. As will be explored in Section 4.2,
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the most appropriate logic to express access control system is modal logic. Our
proposed ABACsh expresses policy creation via ACL-Dl which is a type of modal
logic as will be de discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Table 3.1: Complexity evaluation between ABAC models
Model attributes as-
signment
policy creation safety
check
ABACsh O(1) Via kripke model using
ACL-DL logic
O(n)
ABACα O(1) Not included None
HGABAC (O(N .M)) Via truth table using Kleene
K3 logic
None
The quality investigation is based on selected attributes from access-control
evaluation quality-metrics suggested by NIST organisation [94, 97, 98]. Table 3.2
summarises the evaluation between ABACsh, ABACα and HGABAC. ABACsh is
context-aware and supports operation-object oriented Separation of Duty (SoD),
whereas ABACα and HGABAC do not. In general, attributes-engineering is not
explored by any of those ABAC models, but in terms of the attribute-object as-
signment, ABACsh creates a capability list using deontic operator obligatory per
object. ABACα uses two configuration points in assigning attributes to objects;
the first is an object attribute assignment constraint at object creation time, and
the second is an object attributes modification constraint. HGABAC has a total of
seven mapping functions: direct, consolidate, member, inherited, effective, name,
and parents. These mapping functions support hierarchical feature to ABAC,
yet it increases the complexity of the model by adding additional operations re-
lated to grouping. Therefore, HGABAC has the highest performance complexity
among these three ABAC models. ABACsh performance complexity is higher than
ABACα as it adds extra operations for SoD checks. Finally, ABAC sh is formally
described and verified via a complete formal policy language based on modal logic,
which is ACL-DL. ABACα is missing a complete formal policy language, whereas
HGABAC is based on propositional logic which is more complicated in terms of
computing than ABACsh
3.5 Summary and Discussion
This chapter introduces the characteristics that contribute to enhancing the ABAC
model.
From the prior investigation into the context-aware definition of access control,
it can be concluded that the context attributes are those attributes which affect
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Table 3.2: Quality metrics evaluation between some ABAC models
ABACα HGABAC ABACsh
Support for SoD - - X
Context-aware - - X
The steps required for assigning
attributes to object during ac-
cess control entries creation
Via two
configura-
tion points
Via map-
pings func-
tion total of
seven
Via capability
list
The number of relationship re-
quired to create an access control
policy
Not spe-
cified
Total of four
relations
Total of two
Performance complexity of ac-
cess control enforcement
Low High Moderate
Syntactic and semantic support
for specifying AC rules
Syntactic
only
Language
based on
proposi-
tional logic
Language based
on modal logic
the decision calculation and are not related to the object or subject attributes.
In ABACsh, the context-aware are not pre-defined values. Instead, context at-
tributes reflect the system state values during the access request process. This
consideration meets the IaaS scalability feature.
Furthermore, this chapter clarifies SoD principles and deployment methods.
The proposed SoD deployment for IaaS is a type of operation-object orientated.
This SoD defines a rules-set reflecting the forbidden operations on the set of objects
under a specific situation of a collection of entities attributes. Entities include the
object, the subject, the environment, and the system context. Since the proposed
system is attribute-based, it is not necessary to update different locations if a
new action-restriction is added, deleted, or modified. That support the dynamic
feature of IaaS.
Finally, a comparative study evaluation illustrates how ABACsh is distin-
guished from existing ABAC models. the Evaluation of the ABACsh computation
complexity and access control quality metrics reveals superior results in compar-
ison with two existing ABAC models.
Chapter 4
The Proposed ACL-DL Logic for
ABACsh
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present a formal logic that is able to specify ABACsh.
Being attributes centric is the main different between ABAC models and other
access control categories. The attributes of access-control entities are used to
make access decision; whereas other access control categories are using identities
values. The authentication mechanism is responsible about checking the users
identities, therefore the authorization mechanism through ABAC model focuses
on more fine grained access.
The formal logic approach is selected in this thesis because it supports ac-
cess control system specification, verification and reasoning as will be analysed
in Section 4.2. Access Control Logic (ACL) was investigated in the literature by
different scholars who contribute into clarifying its features as discussed in Section
2.7.3. However, ACL faces a problem of implicit permission because the access
permission is based on entailment through the binary modality says . The format
of says involve the use of subject identity. For example, A says φ interpreted
as a principal A support a formula φ to hold in the system. In another word,
whenever φ is true A says φ is true as well. Moreover, ACL support the primary
access control categories. For example, it needs to be extended with additional
relations to specify RBAC model characteristics. To the best knowledge of the
author, no prior work introduces ACL enhancement for ABAC.
Based on the presented literature, the proposed logic in this research will com-
bine Access Control Logic (ACL) modality says with a Deontic Logic (DL) mod-
ality obligation . ABAC is based on attributes rather than subject identity;
therefore, the problem of implicit permission is eliminated. Deontic Logic is se-
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lected in this research because of its capability to express access control rules as
discussed in Section 2.7.2. The contribution of this study in access control logic
research is illustrated in Section 4.3 .
In this research, the understanding of modal logic and background are based on
[47, 214, 84, 83, 31, 234, 101, 32, 174]. The production of the proposed logic Access
Control Logic-Deontic Logic (ACL-DL) is divided into two steps, as illustrated in
Figure 4.1. The first step involves an inductive definition of a formal language
to produce a well-formed formula in addition to logical-rules and axioms. The
second step is to define a model that is able to interpret the language sentences.
The model is based on a Kripke structure that allows the definition of the truth
notation in model-theory and to define the logical truth valuation within the scope
of ABAC properties.
Figure 4.1: ABAC formal Modelling steps
Formal languages in modal logic are defined by the induction approach that
starts from a specific observation to reach the hypotheses and/or theorems, con-
trary to the deductive approach. Induction is less restricted than deduction, even
though the former is considered logically stronger than the latter. Nevertheless,
in some cases, conclusions can be true in terms of format via deductive reasoning
while being false in terms of the content. Each research area selects the technique
that suits their used language and scenarios. This research uses reasoning within a
finite model, which is a closed world with internal relations. Therefore definitions,
proof, and reasoning by induction are suitable in this scenario where the modal
logic is considering the relational structure within the local scope. Modal formulas
are evaluated from inside the structure at a particular state.
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4.2 Analytical Study: Why Modal Logic is
Suitable to be Used in IaaS Access Control?
Formal logic language is one of the most important aspects of policy specification
[16]. From an administrative point of view, logical policy-based access control
models are significantly expressive. Therefore, they add flexibility and provide an
opportunity to present a variety of authorisation policies. For example, the U.S
military faces a problem with access control due to frequent large-scale changes to
its authorisation policy, thus, as pointed out by [93], a logical access control system
could solve this problem. IaaS cloud is dynamic, therefore there is a frequent
change in access control rules, so, logical access control is more appropriate, as
explained in Figure. 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Why Modal Logic is Used in IaaS Access Control
Access control policy has been investigated for more than forty years [55]. The
first logical specification for access control policies was based on first-order logic,
where permission is directly assigned to a subject, but then a role concept is sug-
gested, as in RBAC where permission is assigned to a role instead of a specific
subject. Consequently, the role concept has been modulated using predicate, but
there is a lack of formalisation, as RBAC does not have any formal semantics.
The lack of formal semantic leads to the consideration of the use of role context-
dependencies, such as location and temporal. Therefore, there is a research dir-
ection that takes into account the involvement of deontic logic and context-aware
concepts. Consequently, modal logic has been selected in this research to specify
an enhanced ABAC model.
Modal logic is a simple yet expressive language for talking about relational
structures. Modal language provides an internal, local perspective on the rela-
tional structure. This feature makes it unique among other forms of logic. Modal
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formulas are evaluated inside a structure at a particular state [31]. This character-
istic of modal logic, introduce an advantage in specifying ABAC that supports the
dynamic features as ABAC decision state is vary based on the provided attributes.
Abadi [2] points out that the core argument in considering the proper type of
formal logic to be used in an access control model is based on the ability of this
logic to write formulas that meet the model requirements. Therefore, this thesis
has found that modal logic is the most suitable logic that satisfies the ABAC model
requirements in IaaS cloud.Even though modal logic is effective in access control
systems, it was not used in practice to enforce authorisation policies even though
modal logic has proved to be used in theoretical access control, as elaborated
by Genovese [83]. Thus, this thesis aims to provide a practical framework for the
proposed ACL-DL based on AI architecture, as Modal Logic is a serious candidate
that supports the logical approach in artificial intelligence systems [102].
A modal logic approach based on deontics is more suitable for expressing ac-
cess control than classical logic. Based on the semantic, the core modalities of
modal logic are possibility and necessity. Deontic logic is the logic of obligation,
permission, and forbidden. It adds intentional connectors to the classical Boolean
connectors [116, 142, 202].
Moreover, dealing with conflicting rules is one of the major limitations of clas-
sical logic in policy specification of access control systems. In a classical logic
such as first-order logic, which is also called predicate logic [102], and its related
approaches, every conclusion can be drawn from a contradictory set of premises,
which leads to trivialisation. This effect is not acceptable for access control prac-
tical purposes [16]. The conflicting rules limitation adds another advantage of
replacing classical logic with deontic logic.
4.3 The Contribution of This Study to Access
Control Logic Research
Several studies on access-control logic have been proposed, mostly related to policy
representation, enforcement, and proof-theory. The literature contains limited
work that explores decidability, Kripke semantics, and the relation between the
logics as we agree with [82] observations. The proposed ACL-DL logic in this
chapter is able to represent policy rules. It has a defined Kripke semantic, in
addition to the relations between the logics.The says operator is combined with
deontic Logic operators (DL) to introduce a modal logic that is able to specify and
reason an ABAC system. DL facilitates security policy rule specification, where
says gives a logical relation among access control system entities.
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Three well-known policy-oriented logics are used in access control systems:
first-order logic, stratified logic, and DL [42, 57]. Based on this research, only DL
is a branch of the modal logic family. Thus, it has been involved in our proposed
access control language. In order for DL to be practical in computer science,
many researchers recommend incorporating it with other modal logic modalities
[38]. The proposed logic incorporates says modality with deontic modalities to
create a logic that is able to formally express attributes based access control.
In current access control logics, permission through entailment is defined where
binary modality says is used. Because the identity of the principal is not included
in this modality, a problem of implicit permission occurs [83]. In the proposed
ACL-DL language, by default, the principal identity is not included. Instead, a
set of attributes and a policy sentence are used to give access permission since
the proposed ABAC model is identity free. Therefore, this limitation is overcome
through the use of a says operator.
However, defining compelling semantics for says is an open problem in access
control logics [61]. This problem is beyond the current research dimension. De-
ontic Logic (DL) paradox research is also beyond the scope of this research. An
attempt is made by this research to partially solve the DL paradox by allowing
a relation between principals [45]. This relation is achieved through the variable
sharing principle. The basic idea is to have at least one shared propositional vari-
able in common between the premises and the conclusion during the reasoning
process. This variable sharing condition is met in the proposed ACL-DL, as the
access control request has a propositional variable that reflects the requested action
(operation on the object) where the conclusion reflects the access decision, which
indicates that this action is allowed or denied. The next section will demonstrate
a formal verification for the proposed ACL-DL logic.
4.4 The Formal Logic Language
Formal languages in modal logic are defined by induction where its start from
specific observation to reach the hypotheses and/or theorems, unlike deductive
definition. Induction is less restricted than deduction, even though the former
considered logically stronger than the latter. Nevertheless, in some cases, some
conclusions are true in term of format via deductive reasoning while it is false in
term of the content. Each research area selects the proper technique that meets
their used language and scenarios. In our research, we are reasoning within a finite
model which is a closed world and has internal relations. Therefore definitions,
proofs and reasoning by induction is suitable in this scenario where the modal
logic is considering the relational structure within the model locally scope. Modal
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formulas are evaluated from inside the structure at a particular state.
4.4.1 Syntax
The syntax of a formal language shows what the formula looks like. A formula is
constructed by connecting an atomic proposition using connectives. The atomic
proposition is a statement or assertion that must be true or false where connectives
are such ( AND = ∧, OR = ∨, not = ¬ ). The syntax of access-control logic
consists of formulas and principle. The formula represents a basic statement that
consists of an action on an object such as read file foo. The principle represents
entities that make the statement, such as people, machine, process, which is mainly
the subject part of the access-control system. The statements can be primitive
and consist of one formula, or can be compound, with more than one formula.
The principle can also be a simple or compound.
4.4.2 Language Operators
The proposed ACL-DL language will make use of the logical operators listed in
Table 4.1, which consist of a well-known access control operator says , and two
main deontic logic operators: obligatory OB, and permissible PE . Deontic operat-
ors reflect the juridical notation of an access control system, whereas says reflects
an access-request notation. OB and PE are unary modalities where says is a
binary modality. OB and PE are dual pairs, as there are many notations in nat-
ural languages where OB is aligned to necessity and PE is aligned to possibility.
Necessity and possibility are the modal-logic basic operators. The says operator
works similarly to how an epistemic-logic operator believes with limited binary
relation of type serial.The representation of a subject (S) requesting an operation
(read) on an object (file x) can be expressed formally in the form S says (read
file x). At this point, the subject triggers an access-request as they believe that
they can obtain access. This access-request is not granted unless there is a policy
rule indicating that the subject is capable of this action. Capability indicates the
access right and can be expressed formally in the form OB (S says (read file x)),
the access-request is then granted.
In the literature, there are other access-control logic operators such as controls,
specks-for, hands-over, and servers, which are not involved in this research. How-
ever, the combination of the deontic operator obligatory (OB) with the access
control operator says in ACL-DL logic is facilitating rule expression.
Deontic operators have a variety of presentations, such as permissible(PE ), ob-
ligatory(OB), optional(OP), impermissible(IM), and omissible(OM) [205, 84, 18].
These operators can be derived from OB , as illustrated in Table 4.2. Therefore,
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Table 4.1: AC-DRL operators with intended informal meaning
OB: obligatory to access
PE: Permissible to access
Says: a principle P make the statement Q, P make statements that they be-
lieve(conceive) to be true
deontic logic operators give the flexibility to accommodate different policy-rules
formations.
Table 4.2: Deontic operators derivation
OB(p)obligatory is a central term
IM(p) = OB( ¬ p), not allowed (impermissible or forbidden)
PE(p) = ¬ OB( ¬ p), allowed (permissible)
OM(p) = ¬ OB(p), you don not have to do it (omissible)
OP(p) = ¬ OB(p) & ¬ OB( ¬ p), you do not have to do it but you can do
it (optional)
4.4.3 Principals Expressions Definition
The set of principal expressions is ranged over P and Q and follow the syntax
in Table 4.3, which is expressed in BNF grammar format. BNF (Backus-Naur
Form) is a commonly-used type of context-free grammar employed in computer
science [180]. The symbol (&) represents a principle in conjunction with another
principle. A is a simple principal name which represents a subject that creates
an access-request, where P and Q represent sets of attributes that are associated
with one of four entities: subject-attributes Att(s), object-attributes Att(o),
environment-attributes Att(e), and context-attributes Att(c). The symbol (|)
means P is quoting Q, which will be useful when the set of attributes is quoting
the subject that makes the access-request.
Example. An example for simple principal A is the subject itself such as
a user of type student. An examples for set of attributes P are a collection of
four attributes sets: Att(s) such as the student is a PhD from computer science
department, Att(o) such as the Student wants to access a resources for computer
science students that are related to post-graduate courses, Att(e) such as this
operation is allowed for school of science and the student registration is valid,
Att(c) such as the time should be in the morning and at semester time.
Table 4.3: principle syntax expression
P ::= A|P&Q|P |Q
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4.4.4 Formulas Definition
Formula definition requires the definition of a class of general modal language that
is relativised to a set of atomic formulas. Let VAR be a non-empty finite set of
atomic formulas which known as well as primitive propositions. The members
of VAR set can be written as VAR=
{
p1,p2,,pn
}
and for simplicity, atomic
formulas are denoted p, q and r to range over VAR elements. The smallest set
of formulas is φ of the modal language L are defined in BNF format in Table 4.4.
Examples. A simple operation on an object such as restarting a virtual
machine is denoted as p, whereas p ∈ V AR. A combination of several atomic
formulas using boolean operators and the language operators discussed in Section
4.4.2 will lead to a combined formulas such as a set of attributes are required to
access an object S|(Att(s)&Att(o) &Att(e)&Att(c)) says (opr → obj).
Table 4.4: ACL formula syntax
All propositional formulas
p ∈ V AR where p is an atomic formula
V AR ⊆ φ
φ ::= V AR | ¬φ | φ∧ϕ | φ∨ϕ | φ→ ϕ | φ ≡ ϕ | Psaysφ | OB(φ)
Finite model in term of Sub-formulas Definition
Defining sub-formulas is useful as a modern finite version has been observed
to be the standard in the literature. Many proofs, such as proof of completeness,
can be formed in a finite universe of formulas. Therefore, the definition of a finite
model consists of formulas where the model size is a function of the number of
sub-formulas which can aid the decidable conclusions of modal logics. Therefore,
’ϕ sub-formula of φ is defined in 4.5.
Table 4.5: ACL Sub-formula syntax
ϕ is a subformula of itself and all the formulas used to build ϕ
if ψ → ¬ϕ, ϕ→ φ ,orOB(ϕ) then ϕ(φ) is a subformula of ψ
if ϕ is a subformula of φ,and φis a subformula of ψ ,then ϕ is a subformula of
ψ
T = ¬ ⊥
ϕ
∨
ψ = ¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ)
ϕ→ ψ = ¬ϕ∨ψ
OB(ψ) = ¬PE(¬ψ)
Psaysψ = ψ
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4.5 The Formal Model Structure
4.5.1 Background
Relational structure is used to explicate the logical structure of modal systems.
It consists of a collection of relations on a defined set. The relational structure
can be observed in various domains. Mathematical structures can be expressed
as a form of relational structures. Moreover, diverse applications discern to be a
relational structure, such as the use of labelled transition systems to model pro-
gram execution in theoretical computer science, in addition to disciplines such as
knowledge representation, computational linguistics, formal semantics, economics,
philosophy, information security, artificial intelligence, and others.
In modal language, a relational structure is called a frame that is a pair
F = (W ,R),where W is a non-empty set and R is a binary relation on W . W
is called the universe (or domain) of F . The elements of W can hold different
names to reflect the modelled system, such as points, states, nodes, times, in-
stants, situations, and others. Binary relations can be serial, reflexive, transitive,
symmetric, convergent and more, depending on the axiom needed to represent the
system state relations. The model for basic language is a pair M = (F ,V)where
F is a frame and V is an assigning function, also known as a valuation function
that maps each proposition letter p in a logical formula φ in W to form a subset
V(p) of W . Formally V : φ → P(W) where P(W) denotes the power set of W .
Informally, V(p) is a set of points in the proposed model where p is true. Given
a modelM = (F ,V) denote thatM is based on the frame F and can be written
in the form (M,R,V(p),V(q), . . . ). Therefore, the model is a relational structure
consisting of a domain, a single binary relation, and the unary relations given to
use by V(p). Both frame and model are considered relational structures. The
frame level is used to make the fundamental assumptions mathematically precise,
and the model level is used to add additional descriptive content.
The possible world W can reflect a variety of system-state elements; it can
contain sentences and numbers, even a combination of elements. The critical
points in designing a model of possible worlds are to define a finite set of world
elements and to decide on the relationships between those elements. The Kripke
structure allows the modelling of logic with more than a single valuation. Its
valuation mechanisms can be divided into two streams: facts presentation, and
actual possibility presentation. The first valuation represents an actual truth
value of an atom through a distinguished state in a W set. This valuation is
accomplished through the labelling function V . The second valuation represents
an actual possibility through relation R that represents the relative possibility of
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the truth value [78].
4.5.2 Semantic Definition
If two logics are combined, such as L1 and L2, if L1 is stronger than L2 based
on the type of axioms applied, then the Kripke-structure model for such a lan-
guage combination should obey the restriction illustrated in Table 4.6 [101]. Con-
sequently, there is a necessity to define an accessibility relation for each operator.
The proposed ACL-DL is a multi-modal logic that combines a says access-control
operator with an obligatory deontic operator. Hence, the axiom followed by
ACL-DL operators are of type serial. Therefore, the two accessibility relations of
ACL-DL are of the same level of strength.
Table 4.6: Multimodal Kripke-structure restriction
V(Lnφ,w) = 1, if V(φ,w) = 1 for every w’ such that wRnw’, and 0 otherwise
A multi-modal system has complex modalities as they are obtained by com-
posing modal operators of different modal logic in order to capture several aspects
simultaneously. As a result, multi-modality allows different means of reasoning and
different means of interaction during the design of an agent situation [42]. There-
fore, multi-modal ACL-DL logic has two frames which can capture two system
states: access-request, and rule checking. Its two accessibility relations, R1,R2
follow a serial binary relation, as illustrated in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: ACL-DL model relation properties
R is serial if for every x in W , there is some y in W , xRy
The ACL-DL first frame F1 = (W ,R1), W consists of the states related
to access-request preparations using a says operator. The second frame F2 =
(W ,R2), W consists of the conceivable states where ABAC rules are checked. R2
is the relation held between the two states w and w’ if all the rules which r estab-
lish in w are also followed in w’. The followed access control rules are denoted by
r. However, different states might have a different set of rules based on the system
requirements. As will be explained later in the ABACsh formal description, we
have two sets of rules: policy rules, and SoD rules.
Definition (Kripke Structure) A Kripke structure of a given a language
L with finite alphabet Σ is a finite structure M that is ordered quadruple inter-
operated in Table 4.8.
The meaning of accessibility relations in the proposed language is based on the
used modalities which are listed in Table 4.9. A specific reading OBφ in access
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Table 4.8: ACL-DL semantic
Model M = (W ,R1,R2,V) where p is an atomic proposition
M is a non-empty set of words or states
R1 is a binary relation which make the frame W ,R1 (W,R1) as an ordered
set, R1 ⊆ W ×W
R2 is a binary relation which reflect deontic property R2 ⊆ W ×W
V is unary relation which map W × VAR to assign true values and referred
to it as labelling function defined as V : VAR → 2w , so that V(p) is the set
of states where p is true
control rules(r) is defined, as in light of r, it must be that φ or in light of r, φ is
obligatory.
Examples. an example for W is a set of access control stages such as access-
request and access-decision. An example for R is an access rule to forbidden an
action such as an action of p = restart virtual machine which can be expressed
as FB(p). An example for evaluation function V is to set a true value for a specific
access-request such as it is permissible to restart a virtual machine PE(p).
Table 4.9: modality reading for defined relation in M
Psaysφ: principal P believes that φ, then vR1w: w should be the actual world
according to the P access-request at v
OBφ: It ought to be that φ, then vR2w: w is an acceptable state according
to the information at v
PEφ: It is permitted to be that φ, then R2: v state consider the information
given by w state in order to make a permission decision
4.5.3 Satisfaction Definition
Satisfaction Definition
A satisfaction relation denoted by (|=) defines when the formulas φ is satisfied
(or true) in the modelM = (W ,R1,R2,V) at state w, where p ∈ VAR, VAR ⊆
φ, v, w ∈ W . Table 4.10 illustrates satisfaction relation for our ACL-DL language,
satisfaction relation is also known as entailment relation. Model M is said to
be satisfied if formula is satisfied by all the model states (worlds). Thus, the
satisfaction definition can be written as M |= φ, if and only if for each w ∈ W ,
there is w |= φ.
4.5.4 Axiom
Axiomatisation is the process followed to identify an axiom. An axiom is also
known as a schema, while some researchers refer to them as classes. An axiom is a
set of sentences which have been proven true in all modal logics and have the same
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Table 4.10: Satisfaction Definition
1.M, w |= T
2.M, w |=⊥
3.M, w |= piffp ∈ V(w)
4.M, w |= φ∧ψ iff both M, w |= φ and M, w |= ψ
5.M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w |= φ
6.M, w |= Psaysφ iff for all v such that wRv and M, v |= φ
7.M, w |= OBφ iff M, v |= φ for all v such that wRv
8.M, w |= PEφ iff M, v |= φ for all v such that wRv and M, v |= φ
form regardless of the used language. Further, some axioms can be true in a specific
branch of modal logic, but not under other types, based on their accessibility
relation properties. Two axioms are sound and complete for all models: K-axiom,
and N-axiom. D-axiom is complete and sound in deontic logic. Unit-axiom is a
well-known axiom in access control logic and means that for every true formula φ
is supported by every principal. Table 4.11 lists the satisfied axioms (denoted with
A) and rules of proof (denoted with R) in the proposed ACL-DL language. Since
ACL-DL logic extends propositional logic with additional modalities, all axioms
and rules which are satisfied by propositional logic are also satisfied by ACL-DL
logic.
Table 4.11: ACL-DL Axiomatization
A0. all axioms of the propositional logic
A1. OB(φ→ ψ)→ (OBφ→ OBψ) (K-axiom)
A2. Asays(φ→ ψ)→ (Asaysφ→ Asaysψ) (K-axiom)
A3. OBφ→ ¬OB¬φ (D-axiom)
A4. Asyasφ→ ¬(Asays¬φ) (D-axiom)
A5. φ→ (Asaysφ) (unit-axiom)
R0. All rules of propositional logic
R1. if ` φ then, ` Asaysφ (N-axiom)
R2. if ` φ then, ` OBφ (N-axiom)
R3. if ` φ and ` φ→ ψ then, ` ψ (Modus Ponens)
4.5.5 Validity, Soundness, and Completeness
Definition (Validity). A formula φ of modal logic is valid if it is true in every state
of every model M is written as |= φ.
Definition (Soundness). Let S be a class of frames. A normal modal logic M
is sound with respect to S ifM⊆ S. In other words,M is sound with respect to
S if for all formulas φ, and all structures Ω ∈ S, ` Nφ → Ω |= φ. If M is sound
with respect to S, it can be said that S is a class of frames for M.
Definition (Completeness). Let S be a class of frames. A logicalM is strongly
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complete with respect to S if for any set of formulas λ∪ {φ} , if λ |= Sφ. That is,
if λ semantically entails φ on S then φ is M-deducible from λ.
The formula φ is valid on ACL-DL frames only if the relations between the
worlds in these frames are serial. ACL-DL soundness and completeness are satis-
fied within K-axiom, N-axiom and D-axiom for all its frames. Also, access-request
frame F1 is sound and complete within the unit-axiom. Another method to val-
idate the model is through valuation function V , by assigning valid formulas to
certain frames. Function V can be defined based on the system requirements to
indicate which formula is valid in a specific scenario that consists of states that
have relations without introducing any new world elements.
4.6 ACL-DL Formal Verification
In this section, the formal verification understanding and background are based
on [11, 32, 51, 102, 214, 216]. Formal verification for a formally designed system
is necessary to provide a mathematical justification that the model does what
it is designed to do. It is widely used in the hardware and software industries.
Therefore there is growing demand for techniques and professionals to apply them.
Formal verification can be calculated by a human through proof-theory. How-
ever, the formal logic modelled through relational structures such as the Kripke-
structure have an advantage in their ability to be verified through automated
formal verification such as model checking approaches. As the systems become
more complicated, there is a need for an automated formal verification. Model
checking based verification is simpler then proof based, as the latter verifies an
infinite classes of models. Whereas the model checking approach can be used to
verify the system property and is classified by the system engineering as post-
development methodology.
In the proposed research, a mode-checking approach is used to verify if the
proposed ACL-DL model M satisfies φ (written M |= φ). However, this model-
checking computation can be achieved if the ACL-DL model meets finite-model
properties.
4.6.1 Finite Model
Finite model theory studies the expressive power of finite models. Most classical
models focus on infinite structures, whereas in computer science the objects are fi-
nite. Hence, this research concentrated on logic over the finite structure. ACL-DL
is described through a Kripke-structure model which is a type of finite structures
model. Therefore, the ACL-DL model is a finite model and can be verified through
CHAPTER 4. THE PROPOSED ACL-DL LOGIC FOR ABACSH 54
finite-model checking approaches. Based on the model defined in Section 4.5, the
below features are met, hence making it a finite model:
 The set of propositional variables is a finite set, as its elements are countable
 The set of logical symbols are also a finite set
 The set of axioms and the set of models are recursively enumerable
4.6.2 Decidability Verification
Different methods can be used to check the decidability of modal logic, such as
finite model, filtration method, tableau system by using decision producer, and
normal system obtained from axioms D,T,B,4, 5.
Definition (Normal Modal Logic). Modal logic is said to be normal if its
sets of formulas are closed under conditions of modus ponens, generalisation and
uniform substitution [32].
ACL-DL is a normal modal logic, as its tautologies satisfy the K-axiom by
default since it also satisfies the D-axiom. ACL-DL also has a dual relation and
is closed under modus ponens, uniform substitution (N-axiom) and generalisation
(unit axiom). Normal modal logic properties allow syntactical validation and con-
clusion drawing while semantical validations and local consequences are managed
through the relational structure. As a result, ACL-DL is decidable as it is a normal
and finite model, hence decidability is not a measurement of the complexity, but
it is rather an indication that the logic is computable. In order to calculate the
complexity of ACL-DL language, it is necessary to verify its satisfiability problem.
4.6.3 Satisfiability Verification
Theorem(Satisfiability). In Section 4.5, every formula φ in the defined ACL-
DL modal language satisfies the proposed ACL-DL formal model based on a finite
tree of depth at most md(φ).
Proof. md(φ) stands for a model depth that reflects the maximum length of
a nested sequence of modality operators. A finite branch tree can be obtained
where model M satisfies φ at its root. Since ACL-DL is a finite model, M
satisfies φ on a shallow tree. There exists a PSPACE algorithm as the shallow
trees branch construction is calculated one branch at a time, where the branch
length is bounded by md(), which makes this processing polynomial in the size of
the input formula. The processing space (memory) is freed before the next branch
is constructed.
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4.6.4 ACL-DL Model Checking
As ACL-DL is modelled on a Kripke structure, it is apparent that a model-checking
approach that takes the state and the path under consideration is required. ACL-
DL is a finite model, therefore, program verification approaches are avoided as
model checking approaches are more convenient for finite state models.
Theorem. The model checking problem for ACL-DL logic can be solved in
time O(‖M‖.‖φ‖), which is a Ptime complete.
Proof. Based on the proposed language in Section 4.4, a formula φ and a
Kripke structureM are defined for ACL-DL logic. If all sub-formulae φ1, φ2, . . . φkofφ
are listed in order such that if φi is a sub-formula of φj then j < i, there exists
an algorithm that inductively labels each state of w (where w ∈ W possible world
set in M with φi or ¬φi based on which formula holds in that state. As some
states are already labelled via a V labelling function (also known as valuation
function) for the atomic propositional statements (p ∈ V AR, V AR ⊆ φ). Only
for some cases where modality operators are involved such as obligatory operator
φi ≡ OBφi for some j <= i. In this case for each state w, all states w that have
an accessibility relation such wRw are checked, and it is determined whether w
has a φi label in the jth step, otherwise it will be labelled as ¬φj. Therefore, this
algorithm can be implemented in O(‖M‖.‖φ‖) time. From a data structure point
of view, this presents an algorithm that consists of a sequence of statements and
if-then-else blocks.
4.6.5 Conclusion
The ACL-DL satisfaction problem is PSPACE solvable based on a modal depth
checking process. The satisfaction problem in ACL-DL concerns the polynomial
amount of space. Formal verification through model-checking is a PTIME as it
is solvable in a polynomial amount of time. Therefore, it is moderate in terms of
time complexity. Moreover, ACL-DL is a decidable logic, which indicates that it
is possible to implement it in a computing machine, which gives it an advantage
over other theory-based logics. This feature allows the linking of the benefit of
the theoretical computer science with the practical implementation.
4.7 ACL-DL Logic Complexity Profile
Evaluation
The ACL-DL complexity profile is a sub-type of simple modal logic; therefore, it
has some similarities in terms of the modal-checking problem and the satisfiability
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problem. Table 4.12 compares two logic complexity metrics: model-checking, and
satisfiability between ACL-DL Logic, Propositional Logic, and First-Order Logic.
Table 4.12: ABACsh sentences formal description
Model checking Satisfiability
Proposed logic: ACL-
DL
PTIME PSPACE-
complete
Propositional Logic PTIME NP
First-Order Logic PSPACE-complete Undecidable
It has been proven in Section 4.6 that ACL-DL model checking is PTime,
which indicates that ACL-DL computing complexity is reasonable compared to
First-Order Logic. ACL-DL matches the complexity of Propositional Logic, but
regarding expressive power, Propositional Logic is not able to distinguish the level
of truth as its validation mechanism is based on truth tables while ACL-DL is a
modal logic.
Regarding the satisfiability problem, First-Order Logic is undecidable as it is a
type of infinite model, and only under some fragments is it decidable. For example,
ACL-DL can be translated to be FOL2 as a fragment of First-Order Logic with
two variables. ACL-DL is formally proven to be PSPACE-hardness, as discussed
in Section 4.6.
4.8 Summary and Discussion
Modal logic is appropriate for use in the access control field, as elaborated in Table
2.3 and investigated in Section 4.2. This chapter presents ACL-DL which combines
access control logic features with policy rule specifications based on deontic logic.
Several studies on access-control logic have been proposed, mostly related to
policy representation, enforcement, and proof-theory. The literature contains lim-
ited work that explores decidability, Kripke semantics, and the relation between
the logics. The proposed ACL-DL logic in this chapter is able to represent policy
rules through combining Access Control Logic with Deontic Logic. ACL-DL is de-
cidable as it is a type of modal logic. Furthermore, ACL-DL has a defined Kripke
semantic, in addition to the relations between the logics via says operator.
Chapter 5
ABACsh Formal Specification and
Logical reasoning via ACL-DL
logic
5.1 Introduction
The logical approach is more appropriate for access control specification, verific-
ation and reasoning than calculus-based approaches as it allows easy detection
of patterns of correct or incorrect reasoning [16, 47]. As clarified by [97] in Fig-
ure 2.4, access control modal must be formally specified in order to facilitate the
access-control mechanism implementation phase.
This chapter employs the proposed ACL-DL in specifying and reasoning about
the enhanced attribute-based access control, ABACsh. Therefore, it begins with
an identification of ABACsh properties, then proceeds with formal specification
and logical reasoning in Sections 5.3 and 5.5, respectively.
5.2 ABACsh properties
The main stages of ABACsh model are described as followed and illustrated in
Figure 5.1.
 The access control state before access request is triggered:
– Define the entities set which is involved in the ABAC process. The
entities are the subject, the object, the environment, and the system
context
– An Attributes Assignment function creates the attribute pairs (name:value).
It assigns a set of attributes for each entity that reflect its character-
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istics. The context attribute values are updated based on the current
context state.
– Policy Creation function. This creates ABAC policy rules that reflect
what sets of attributes access an action. Policy rules utilise an access
capability format to create access rule entries.
– SoD rules creation. This creates rules to forbid a collection of attributes
from performing a specific operation on an object.
 The access control state after access request is triggered:
– Att():function to return attributes values.
– SoD():function to check if SoD rules exist for the current request.
– Policy(): function to check if permitted rules exist for the current re-
quest.
– After rules checking, if the conclusion indicates that the access-request
is permitted, then access is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.
Figure 5.1: ABACsh model flow-chart
The interpretation of the Kripke-structure model (Section 4.5 ) in the context
of ABACsh allows the definition of what it means for a formula to be true at a given
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state in a structure. The ABACsh formal model is in the formM = (W ,R1,R2,V)
and described in the following sub-sections.
5.3 Formal Specification
ACL-DL logic is used to formally specify ABACsh properties. Access control
model formalisation requires the identification of a set of entities which will be
active within the system and a set of actions. If the set of entities are denoted as
E= { enitiy1, . . . , entitiyn} and the set of actions A={ a1, . . . , an} . The decision
for each action ∈ A in relation to the set of entities in our ABACsh model is either
to be permitted or to be forbidden. The authorisation policy is expressed based
on the ACL-DL logic. The authorisation process takes as an input the attributes
of the subject, the object, the environment, and the system context to enforce the
access-control rules.
5.3.1 Primitive Proposition
Primitive proposition indicates the basic facts which may hold in a system. In
ABACsh, the action is represented as the primitive proposition. An action con-
sists of an operation on an object (opr, obj). Each action in the system must
have at least one policy rule that controls its access permissions. A specific per-
mission of an action is called a capability, which is considered a type of formula.
For example, it is permissible for a Virtual Machine (VM) to be restarted. The
primitive proposition is an action of restarting VM and denoted as p, where the
capability represents the privilege of this action as to be permitted and formally
specified using a deontic operator as PE(p).
5.3.2 ABACsh possible worlds (states) W
W is a non-empty set of ABACsh states (or worlds). The world is described in
terms of a non-empty set φ of propositional constants. Each state reflects one
of the access control stages. Each stage indicates the system functionality and
the possible states that involve knowledge and rules. The ABACsh possible world
elements are defined in Figure 5.2. The initial state involves defining the basic
system elements such as the set of subjects, objects, and rules. Access control
modelling starts when an access request is triggered; therefore, the first state is an
access-request (w1). The next state is related to an attributes assignment function
Att(), where the attributes-gathering state takes the access-request knowledge
from state (w2) to return the required attribute values. After that, the state
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quoting (w3) uses the attribute sets to quote the access request on behalf of the
subject, so the access-request sentence will be re-formulated. Then, the (w3) state
will feed (w4) with the re-formulated access request to perform a SoD check. If
the SoD() returns true, then there is a restriction on this action. Hence access
is denied, and the access control process ends in the state (w6) (access decision).
Otherwise, if there are no restrictions on this access request, the (w4) state will
feed the (w5) state with the re-formulated access-request to check if there is a
policy rule to allow this action. If the access request has a rule that indicates that
the requested operation on an object is necessary, then the process ends in the
state (w6), and the access decision will be allowed; otherwise, access is denied.
5.3.3 Binary Relation R
ACL-DL has a binary relation of type serial between W elements. There is a
relation between the states where one state is possibly getting information from
the other state. Therefore, state w2 must consider state w1 in order for w2 to
make a decision. R(w1,w2) is known as an accessibility relation, as it defines the
relation under which w2 is a state accessible from the state w1 . R(w1, w2) is
also called a possibility relation, as it considers what states are required in a given
state. Each state feeds the next state with knowledge in order to proceed, until
the last state is reached, where an access decision is made, as explained in Section
5.3.2.
The initial state w0 is not presented in the diagram as it holds the initial state of
the system that initialises the basic system sets, such as the set of subjects, objects,
and attributes. Figure 5.2 shows the serial relation of the world elements. There
exist two relations, one for each modality. The says has relation R1 between the
states that are responsible for preparing the access request to meet the ABACsh
properties by allowing the attributes to act on behalf of the subject that issues the
access request. The obligatory (OB) relation R2 between the states is responsible
for finding the access-decision between the rule sets. Therefore; (w1, w2) ∈ R1
from the access control point of view, represent a relation between states that are
involved in the access-request formulation. While (w4, w5) ∈ R2 from the rules
point of view, represent the relation between the states that are involved in access-
decision determination. Only the successors (followers) of the current state can be
inspected by the logic operators. The successors are states that are accessible by
the current state through one R-step. For example, if the current state is a w4-
SoD-check, then moving one R-step reaches the successor state w5:Policy check,
which is inspected via OB operator.
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Figure 5.2: ACL-DL Serial relation for ABACsh model
5.3.4 Mapping Function V and Rules Creation
V is a valuation function that captures the case in which the access request is al-
lowed in a specific state of the system structure. Valuation is a critical function in
access-logic as it associates each system statement (primitive proposition) which
belongs to the system of well-formed formulas φ, a set of states in W , therefore,
V interprets at which state a primitive proposition is true. Unlike standard state
notation, the state in a Kripke model is not completely defined using a valuation
function. The SoD() and the Policy() are valuation functions where they give a
true value to the primitive proposition statements at a specific system state. The
SoD() indicates which access-request formula is true at state w4:SoD check, so
that the next state will be w6:access-decision, where the decision will be access
denied due to the SoD (SoD rules). Otherwise, w4:SoD check state will have a rela-
tion with w5:Policy check state, if the access request entry has no constraint. The
Policy() indicates which access request formula is true at the state w5:Policy check,
where the policy rule indicates which access is allowed and which is denied. Rules
creation in the proposed ABACsh is in the capability format and is specified using
deontic operators. The focus of our rules is on the object not on the subject.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to use a capability mechanism instead of other
mechanisms such as an access control list (ACL) [94, 47]. Deontic operators facilit-
ate rule expression as they are able to describe various legal rules such as permiss-
ible(PE), obligatory(OB), optional(OP), impermissible (IM ), omissible(OM ).
Another wording for impermissible is forbidden (FB). Therefore; the well-formed
formulas in our proposed ACL-DL are able to formally present rule expressions.
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Table 5.1: ABACsh sentences formal description
No System
State
ABACsh sentences ACL-DL formal rep-
resentation
1 w0 Define finite sets of entities Subject set={s1, s2, .sn}
2 w0 Create primitive propositions finite
set that reflect the system operations
on objects
p=(opr→obj)
3 w1 Access-request where a subject make
a statement to perform an action
S says (opr →obj)
4 w2 Attributes gathering function Att() Att()=[name:value]
5 w3 The access-request is reformulated as
attributes quoting the subject
S|(Att(s)&Att(o)
&Att(e)&Att(c)) says
(opr → obj)
6 w4 Forbidden operation on an object
within the current set of attributes
based on SoD rules
OB(¬Access-request)
FB(Access-request)
7 w5 Authorized operation on an object
within the current set of attributes
based on ABAC policy rules
OB(Access-request)
8 w6 Granted access request or denied PE(Access-decision),
FB(Access-decision)
The main difference between the SoD rules and the policy rules is that SoD rep-
resents constraints on specified objects, while each object must have at least one
capability in the policy rules. Therefore, it is more likely that SoD-rules reflect
forbidden actions, while policy-rules reflect what ought to be performed on an
object.
5.3.5 ABACsh Sentences Formal Description
Each row in Table 5.1 gives an example of ABACsh sentences written in ACL-
DL formal description. A collection of sets must be defined in the initial state
w0. Row no.1 gives an example of defining a finite set of the entity subject.
The proposed model requires six sets: the subjects, the objects, the subject-
attributes, the object-attributes, the environmental-attributes, and the system
context-attributes. The ABACsh model has two types of principals, either the
subject that issues the access-request, or a set of entities attributes quoting the
subject. The primitive proposition can be formally written as in row no.2. The
access request state w1 is described in row no.3, where a says operator is used to
make a request.
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5.4 Case Study
ABACsh formal specification will be demonstrated through two case studies in this
section.
The first example is shown in Figure 5.3 and is taken from [44]. This example
illustrates an access permissions for a stuff named John. The formal representation
of the ABAC policy rules Example 1 is listed in 5.2.
The second example from [73] is shown in Figure 5.4, and the formal specific-
ation of the ABAC policy using ACL-DL logic is illustrated in Table 5.3.
Figure 5.3: ABAC policy Example 1
Figure 5.4: ABAC policy Example 2
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Table 5.2: formal description for Example 1
Entities
Sub=John, obj1=HR App, obj2=Finance App, obj3=PMO App, obj4=Email
App, Context= Network address and time, Environment=the organization has
different departments
Policy Set
OB ( [Att(sub)=(FN:John,LN:Smith,DOB:31/12/9797) ]
∧
[Att(c)=IP:ipinternal] says (view →obj1) )
OB([Att(e)=Dept:Finance]
∧
[Att(s)=JobCode:F1***]
∧
[Att(c)=NW:ipinternl, time:8:00
∨
¡17:00] ( says (view →obj2) )
OB( [Att(s)=JobCode:F1234]
∧
[Att(e)=loc:Ottawa] ( says (access pro-
ject:Ottawa) →obj3))
OB([Att(e)=Dept:*] says (access →obj4))
Privileges set for John
PE( sub says (view →obj1))
PE( sub says (view →obj2))
PE( sub says (access project:Ottawa) →obj3))
PE( sub says (access→obj4))
Table 5.3: formal description for Example 2
Attributes
Att(sub1)= (Smith & IRS Auditor), Att(shb2)=(IRS Auditor & Johnson),
Att(c)=(time:09:30), Att(obj)=(Smith Tax Return, Tax, Return)
Quoting
sub1|Att(sub1), sub2|Att(sub2), obj| Att(obj), context| Att(c)
SoD rules
OB ¬ ( [Att(sub)=Smith∧IRS Auditor] ∧ [Att(obj)= Smith Tax Return])
says (write→obj))
Policy rules
OB([Att(sub)= IRS Auditor]
∧
[Att(obj)=Tax Ruturn ]
∧
[Att(c)=time08:00∨
time¡18:00] says ((read→ obj) ∨ (write→obj))
Privilege set
PE( sub1 says (read→obj))
PE( sub2 says ((read→obj) ∨(write→obj))
FB ( sub1 says (write→obj))
Deny exception in Example 2 can be described via SoD rules to reflect the
constraint of the operation-object. Subject 1 attributes are restricted to perform
the writing operation. Therefore, the resulted privileges allow Subject 1 to read
an object. Subsequently, there are no restrictions on Subject 2; it can read and
write on the objects, as both subjects have the attribute of IRS Auditor.
As indicated by the examples, there are several advantages to implementing
an ABAC model policy over other access control models, as ABACs permissions
are not based on user identity. ABAC reduces the risk profile as the access rights
given are based on staff attributes. When the attributes are changed, the access
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permission is dropped automatically without a need for a manual delete on the
access permission list. There is also a lower cost for updating the access control
rights.
5.5 Logical reasoning
The knowledge and understanding of this section are based on several investiga-
tions in the area, hence; the main references are [69, 114, 102]
5.5.1 Overview
Traditional access control reasoning mechanisms are based on a simple search on
a table or a list to find the access matrix. However, there is demand for a rigorous
reasoning mechanism due to the evolving complexity of access control systems.
Therefore, access control reasoning approaches based on formal logic are adequate
for access control systems, as illustrated in the related work in Chapter 2.
There are two steps to deploying logic in access control; firstly to define the logic
which describes the access control model, and secondly, to define the reasoning
mechanism [85]. Logic was defined to express ABACsh in Section 5.3. This section
will demonstrate the proposed reasoning mechanism based on the inference which
is used to verify the logical consequence of ABAC policy.
The category of reasoning followed in this research is called closed world reas-
oning, as all positive information is specified and it is concluded that any positive
fact that is not specified or cannot be inferred will be false. Therefore, a complete
knowledge has been assumed by specifying allowable access through a rule cre-
ation method as interpreted via a Kripke-structure. In contrast, there is an open
world of reasoning used by classical logic such as First Order Logic [56].
Logical reasoning can be defined as a process followed to reach a new conclusion
from a given premise [114]. Reasoning using the Kripke model is a semantic level.
However, there is a requirement to add an extra inference rule to be able to reason
the RBAC model [117]. The reasoning via inference rule is needed if the formal
logic is not rich enough to express the policy specification or to capture certain
system relations that cannot be described by the Kripke structure [85].
In this research, ACL-DL logic axioms and rules are sufficient to allow the use
of the formulas to reason the ABACsh model.
5.5.2 Reasoning Methodology
In ABAC models, the access request will be granted if the collection of the attribute
sets is permissible to perform an operation on an object. In the proposed reasoning
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Figure 5.5: preparations for reasoning process
process, the logical consequences are based on the model-theory relations among
the system defined the world, as explored in Section 5.3 and summarised in Figure
5.5.
In an ABAC model scenario, the information required for an access-request de-
cision is not available beforehand. Hence, the obtainable information can provide
a clue to the reasoning process. The available information is expressed in logical
sentences φ, each of which gives a specific fact which may not represent everything
about the world (access request state). These sentences can be combined into a
logical theory, which in this research is a model theory.
Kripke structure is used as a model theory, where the proposed access control
model is described in terms of states that are connected via relations, and truth
values are given through a valuation function. This representation of access control
model is used to draw a conclusion, where a set of true sentences (premises)
entails a conclusion only if every state that satisfies the premises also satisfies the
conclusion. However, it is not practical to check all possible worlds to find the
logical entailment. Therefore, logical reasoning provides a tool in such scenario.
There are two types of logical reasoning: monotonic, and non-monotonic. The
main difference between them is that monotonic reasoning follows a deductive
inference approach where the information should be complete before the reasoning
process starts, as is the case in First-Order Logic. In contrast, non-monotonic
reasoning follows a defeasible inference approach where reasoning will be based on
the available information. Therefore, if the information changes, the conclusion
will also change. In this research, a non-monotonic reasoning approach is more
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suitable as it suits the modal logic and artificial intelligence characteristics [23, 15].
5.5.3 Reasoning about ABACsh
Figure 5.6: Reasoning process
The inference mechanism of the proposed ABACsh model framework is illus-
trated in Chapter 6. If the inference mechanism can reach a conclusion on the
PE (Access-request), then the request will be granted, otherwise it will be denied.
The inference mechanism is intelligent agent-based where the decision-making pro-
cess is computed.
The applied reasoning method is based on a non-monotonic approach. There-
fore, the access privilege decision is based on the available information from policy-
rules and SoD-rules. Whenever rules are updated, the access privilege will also be
automatically updated.
The access control argument consists of the set of sentences. Section 5.3.5
described ABACsh formal sentences. The set of sentences that provide evidence
called premises where the conclusion is the sentence that is acquired by the end of
the reasoning process. In an ABACsh model, there are three situations of premises
and two possible conclusions. The first case is when there is a SoD rule indicating
that access is denied. The second case is when there is an obligatory entry in the
policy rules indicating that access is allowed. The last case is when there is no
entry in the SoD or policy rules that fulfils the requested access, hence access is
denied.
The reasoning process can be visualised as in Figure 5.6. The access request
is only granted if the inference engine can make a conclusion that PE (access-
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decision). Such a decision is based on a series of access-control capability entries
in SoD rules and policy rules.
5.6 Summary and Discussion
Formal logic is appropriate for use in specifying and reasoning about ABACsh as
elaborated in this chapter. The introduced formal specification (5.3) and logical
reasoning (5.5) showed an accepted presentation for ABACsh model relations and
states which leads to better understanding of how this access control is work-
ing. This facilitates the next stages which are the design phase (Chapter 6) and
implementation phase (Chapter 7).
ACL-DL which is a type of modal logic shows an expressive representation
for ABACsh. Employing logic in access control model specifications, avoid the
ambiguity and allow a formal representation. Moreover, it helps administrators
to automatically derive the consequences of their policies.
Chapter 6
An Intelligent Framework for
ABACsh
6.1 Introduction
Figure 6.1: ABAC mechanism function points based on XACML framework
This chapter will present the design of the proposed ABACsh model framework,
taking into consideration the essential ABAC elements and a knowledge-based
agent architecture. ABAC’s underlying mechanism function points are illustrated
in Figure 6.1, extracted from an XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage) framework [98, 157] . The main four points are PEP, PDP, PIP and PAP:
the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), where the access decision is enforced; the
Policy Decision Point (PDP), where the access control is processed to produce
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a decision; the Policy Information Point (PIP), where the information related to
access control processing is supplied to the PDP, and the Policy Administration
Point (PAP), where the system administrator feeds the system with the access
control policy rules. The artificial intelligence categories involved are agent archi-
tecture and logical reasoning. The aim of proposing an intelligent framework for
ABACsh is to design a dynamic attribute-based access control that can think and
act rationally. The following sections will illustrate how artificial intelligence is
utilised to meet this aim.
6.2 AI scope for the Proposed Framework
According to [69, 149, 182], artificial intelligence systems are designed to think and
act. They can be categorised into four types based on the intention of the system:
Thinking Humanly, Acting Humanly, Thinking Rationally and Acting Rationally.
The category of Thinking Rationally leads to an evolved need for the logic field
in artificial intelligence. Involving logic in an intelligent system faces two substan-
tial obstacles. The first one is the difficulty of presenting informal-knowledge using
a formal logical notation though the certainty level is less than 100%. The second
is that solving problems theoretically is different from solving them practically
when the machine capacity is taken into consideration.
Figure 6.2: Basic structure of a rule-based expert system (Negnevitsky 2011)
The category of Acting Rationally initiates the development of a computer
agent. Prior to computer science, the term agent was used in different fields.
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Therefore, there are various definitions of agent. However, it can be defined as
an entity that acts within an environment by sensing its surroundings to update
its knowledge and acts upon that to meet specific goals [199]. The agent func-
tion represents an abstract mathematical description, whereas the agent program
represents an agent implementation within a physical system.
Problem-solving through an intelligent agent involves four stages. Firstly, the
agent formulates its goal. Secondly, it formulates the problem based on five steps:
initial state, possible actions, transition model that describes what each action
does, goal test and path cost. Thirdly, it searches for a solution by looking for a
sequence of actions that leads to the goal. Fourthly, in the execution stage, the
solution found is implemented. However, the problem-solving agent is inflexible as
each possible state should be hard-coded. Therefore, the complexity of the search
stage grows exponentially in relation to the number of states in addition to its
inability to infer unobserved information. Therefore, there is a need for logic to
reason about the possible states instead of hard-coded all predicted states.
Figure 6.3: AI scope for the proposed framework
Knowledge-based reasoning is a step in overcoming problem-solving agent lim-
itations. The logic provides a natural language for describing and reasoning about
the system. The knowledge-based system is given facts about the external world,
and it is asked queries about that world. The rule-based expert system is a pop-
ular method that is used to build knowledge-based systems. The rules are used
to represent knowledge in the format of IF-THEN. The structure of a rule-based
expert system is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The Inference engine is the reasoning
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component whereby the system concludes by linking the rules given in the know-
ledge base with facts supplied from the database. The explanation facilities allow
the user to interact with the expert system to get justification regarding the results
produced by the inference engine.
Therefore the AI scope for the proposed intelligent-framework for ABACsh is
illustrated in 6.3. Modal logic is found to be the most appropriate logic to be used
in AI as discussed by [140] and highlighted in Section 4.2 .
6.3 Logical-Based Agent Architecture
Intelligence security is a fertile approach, as most existing security paradigms suffer
from reactive and fragmented approaches [115]. In a frequently changing infra-
structure, deploying an agent-based mechanism will be an advantage [63]. Modal
logic is a candidate that supports a logical approach in artificial intelligence sys-
tems [102]. The main component of a knowledge-agent is a Knowledge-Base (KB)
that consists of a set of sentences expressed using formal logic, in addition to two
generic functions that involve logical inference. The first function is known as
TELL, and adds new sentences (facts) to the KB to provide it with the required
information. The second function is known as ASK, and queries the known inform-
ation from the KB to determine the next step. The process between TELL and
ASK will end as soon as the desired action is selected. The interaction between
these two generic functions is similar to the updating and querying in databases,
as illustrated in Table 6.1. When an agent program is called upon, it performs
two main actions. Firstly, it will TELL the KB what it perceives. Secondly, it
ASKs the KB what action should be taken.
Table 6.1: A generic Knowledge-based agent function [182]
function KB-AGENT(percept) returns an action
static: KB, a knowledge base
t, a counter, initially 0, indicating time
TELL(KB, MAKE-PERCEPT-SENTENCE(percept,t))
action ← ASK(KB, MAKE-ACTION-QUERY(t))
TELL(KB, MAKE-ACTION-SENTENCE(action,t))
t ←t + 1 return action
Therefore, agent-based architecture is suitable to represent an ABAC model.
The logical agent, furthermore, will be appropriate for the proposed modal lo-
gic scheme. Table 6.2 demonstrates how knowledge-based agent architecture can
represent an ABAC system. The logical agent can be designed to represent an
access-request state through a process of inference to derive a new representation
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Table 6.2: mapping knowledge-based agent with ABAC requirements
Components agent architecture ABAC requirements
knowledge
base(KB)
Background sentences Predefined sets of entities,
attributes and policy rules
To represent action(s) The action is access-
decision
inference
system
Infer (i.e arrive to a conclu-
sion via reasoning) hidden
properties of the world to
add new sentence to KB
New sentences are added
each time an access-request
is triggered which consist of
a combination of attributes
with the request operation
Infer based on the pre-
defined sentences and the
new ones to conclude with
appropriate actions
Reasoning based on the at-
tributes set and the policy
rule-sets to conclude with
an appropriate action (allow
or deny) the access-request
of the access-request state that can be used to deduce required actions. The pro-
posed access-control logic agent will be founded on knowledge-based agents, as
this type of agent is logic-based [182].
6.4 ABACsh Conceptual Requirement
Based on the analysis and investigations addressed within Chapter 2 and Chapter
3, the critical requirements in designing an ABAC model are listed below.
Req.1 ABAC model definition requires to identify the configuration points. Each
point should be formalised via the proper languages. The configuration point
indicates the necessary configurations to be accomplished via the ABAC
model processing for computing the access decision. These points are known
as functional points. It is more convenient to minimise the number of con-
figuration points as they affect the system's computational complexity.
Req.2 ABAC is identity-free. Therefore, identifications such as subject-id are not
the main elements in access-decision processing.
Req.3 Avoid the creation of lists or groups in the design, as ABAC is intended to
be fixable and able to cope with large enterprises.
Req.4 Context-attributes reflect the current system state, whereas environment-
attributes reflect the fixed system characteristics.
Req.5 ABAC is a multi-factor decision. Therefore it enables fine-grained access
control.
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Req.6 There are no predefined privileges for subjects as the privileges are computed
after an access request is triggered. Policy rules set in ABAC are specified
based on attributes. As a result, the permissible operations will be defined
upon access-request.
Req.7 The two basic functionalities in ABAC are attribute-assignment and rules-
creation.
Req.8 Security principles such as Separation of Duty (SoD) must be enforced.
The enhanced attribute based access control ABACsh fulfils requirement Req.1
by employing one main configuration point that is ABAC agent. This agent takes
as an input, the access request parameters which consist of the subject, the object,
and the operation (s, o, opr). Then it returns the access decision that indicates
if the subject is allowed to operate on the object or it is denied. Compared to
ABACα, which has four configuration points, the policy configuration here is re-
duced to one, as the proliferation of policy configuration points can introduce
difficulties in policy expression and comprehension [108]. For Req.2, in the Policy
Decision Point (PDP), the decision-making process considers the subject attrib-
utes in addition to other attributes, instead of depending solely on the subject
identity information. In Req.3, grouping is studied by HGABAC [192] to facilit-
ate the addition of a hierarchy feature to ABAC. However, grouping and listing
will impede the flexible nature of ABAC [52, 98]. Therefore, permissions grouping
and listing are avoided in this ABACsh. The decision calculation is based on four
sets of attributes: subject-attributes, object-attributes, environment-attributes,
and system-context attributes, all of which are taken into consideration in the
proposed design to meet requirement Req.4. System context attributes have a
special sensor to obtain an up to date system state to meet requirement Req.5.
The privilege decision is calculated based on the attributes relation defined in the
policy-rules. Therefore; the privilege value is returned after the access-decision
is triggered, which meets the requirement Req.6. There are two core functions
of ABACsh. The first function takes place at the initial system stage, where the
attribute pairs (name:value) are created for the defined access control system en-
tities (subject, object, environment, and context). The second function is rules
creation, which represents the SoD-rules and Policy-rules in the form of capability
which indicates the access-rights. These two functions meet the ABAC require-
ment Req.7. An initial SoD is introduced in this design in the type of a DSoD. The
elimination of policy-rule conflicts can be achieved by an object-operation oriented
constraint. A formal presentation of the proposed SoD enforcement sentences is
defined and will be flexible to manage the set of constraints and meet the system
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requirements Req.8 since the administrator can modify the set of SoD sentences.
The proposed SoD will be enforced after the access-request is triggered where an
action is forbidden based on a collection of attributes.
6.5 The Proposed Framework
The proposed ABACsh model framework focuses on three functional points in
reference to XACML framework: PDP, PIP and PAP as illustrated in Figure 6.4.
The framework flow is described below:
Figure 6.4: The proposed Intelligent Framework for ABACsh
 The main access-control entities, which are subject and object. The subject
issues the access request. The object will provide the resources if the request
is authorised.
 The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforces the access decision. PEP can
be a firewall as it depends on the implemented security appliance type. It
takes the access request as an input and sends it to the PDP. It receives the
access-decision from PDP and enforces it into the object.
 The ABAC agent is the logical access-control component. It is built based
on knowledge-based agent architecture. It involves two main configuration
points based on an XACML framework. The first is PIP, where the ABAC
model collects the information needed in an access-decision process. The
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second is PDP, where the information collected from PIP in addition to the
access-rules provided by PAP are used to infer an access decision.
 The PIP involves information collection as follows:
– A sensor that collects the attributes needed requested by attribute func-
tion Att()
– A context-sensor that collects the current values of the system context-
attributes
– Information that reflects the domain-specific content is stored in KB
data storage
 The PDP involves the core logical reasoning that takes place in an inference
mechanism where the access decision is processed. The inference mechanism
is the logical engine where a domain-independent algorithm is used to com-
pute the access-decision and return an action value through the actuators
to the PEP.
 The PAP involves rule creation by the system administrators. This point
involves two types of rules, as follows:
– Policy rules contain a predefined set of policies
– SoD rules that reflect constraints to avoid policy-rule conflicts.
The main ABACsh processing stages that are required to be formally described
are attribute assignment, policy rules, SoD rules, and access requests, as illustrated
in Figure 6.5. Based on this information, the inference mechanism can draw a
conclusion as to whether the requested access is to be allowed or denied.
Figure 6.5: ABACsh processing stages
6.6 Summary and Discussion
Artificial Intelligence mechanisms are recommended to be used in a dynamic and
rule-based system such as ABAC in IaaS cloud. Two AI categories are utilised in
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the proposed intelligent framework for ABACsh. These categories are Act Ration-
ally and Think Rationally as illustrated in Figure 6.3 and discussed in Section 6.2.
The Act Rationally challenges are solved by using formal logic while the Think
Rationally challenges are solved by using modal logic.
The framework is designed based on knowledge-agent and it employee rule-
based expert system method. This intelligent system is not based on machine
learning which will have a percentage of correct answers. This system is based on
the available rules, therefore it is not a type of uncertain approch. The system
must guarantee an access decision. In reference to the framework functional points
in Section 6.5, an enforcement architecture aims to implement them through IaaS
platform as will be demonstrated in Section 7.3.1, whereas, a prototype imple-
mentation of ABACsh will be discussed in Section 7.3.2.
The purpose of this ABACsh framework is to prove that AI architecture can
contribute in supporting a dynamic access control which meets IaaS characterist-
ics. In regards to guaranteeing behaviour, the followed mechanism in this chapter
is based on knowledge available. If there is a shortage in knowledge, the access
decision will be denied. There are other AI categories related to uncertain know-
ledge such as probabilistic reasoning, However, uncertain reasoning is out of this
research scope.
Chapter 7
ABACsh Implementation for IaaS
Via OpenStack
7.1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates the visibility of ABACsh in IaaS cloud by introducing
an enforcement architecture based on OpenStack. That is followed by a proto-
type implementation and performance evaluation that illustrates the advantages
of the proposed ABACsh extension over the existing access control model. The
contributions of this chapter are as below.
 Designing enforcement architecture for ABACsh that utilises telemeter ser-
vice deployment to be used in feeding Policy Information Point (PIP) with
attributes values.
 A prototype implementation of an extended nova access control model with
an intelligent ABAC.
– Extend the nova policy enforcement point (PEP) to communicate with
an external policy engine
– The proposed external policy-engine works as policy decision point
(PDP)
– The introduced PDP follows ABACsh by
* Utilising the attributes in access decision-making process.
* Involving forward-chaining algorithm that works as logical reason-
ing for access decision processing.
 Three experiments are studied to compare and contrast the extended ABACsh
with the default nova-OpenStack access control model.
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 The Quality of Service (QoS) measurement is discussed based on response
time as a performance metric.
This chapter has four main parts. The first part introduces an overview of the
primer concepts which are considered as a base for building these chapter contri-
butions. The preliminaries are an OpenStack overview, OpenStack Access Control
Model (OSAC), Policy Engine and forward-reasoning algorithm. The second part
demonstrates ABACsh enforcement architecture for OpenStack and the prototype
implementation. The third part illustrates the performance evaluation with the
results and discussion. The fourth part presents comparative study of ABAC
models implementation in OpenStack. This analysis involves ABACsh and two
ABAC from the literature which are ABACα and HGABAC.
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Open source IaaS-Cloud Test-bed
A study of the implementation tools in Cloud computing environment was studied
by [185]. The tools were classified as below:
 Mathematical modelling: Suitable for finding optimal values and predicting
behaviour
 Simulations: Does not represent an actual Cloud such as CloudSim, Green-
Cloud, iCanCloud and teach cloud.
 Testbed: Hardware platform which can be a commercial-based such as
Amazon EC2, Google App, Windows Azura, or a research-based such as
OpenCloud, OpenCirrus. Software platform such as OpenNebula, Nimbus,
OpenStack.
In order to experiment and test the access control mechanism of IaaS, there is
a need to investigate the available testbeds to find a platform that allows source-
code modifications. Therefore a brief study in the available open source test-beds
has been made. The results of the literature are summarized in Table 7.1.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the numbers of hits of popular Cloud tools from leading
academic libraries. Amazon EC2 is not open source, but it has been used by many
academic authors to validate their work, as its fees are cheaper than IBM Cloud.
Eucalyptus has an active committee and it is used by Sony, Puma, NASA, Trend
Micro and other companies to build their private Clouds, but it does not support
the LVMM process [213].
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Figure 7.1: Number of hits in variety of academic search engines related to IaaS
platforms
Table 7.1: OpenStack core components
Ref. testbed options Aim of the
Study
Observations
[171] OpenNebula,
Eucalyptus,
OpenStack
A study to find
out which to use
in their private
cloud
OpenNebula easier in deploy-
ment where OpenStack is more
complex but has and active com-
munity
[151] OpenNebula,
Eucalyptus,
OpenStack
To evaluate op-
eration of web-
hosting service
and Cloud Ab-
straction Layer
(CAL)
OpenNebula take more time for
deployment the the rest while
Openstack was the faster.
[12] OpenNebula,
Eucalyptus,
Nimbus
Comparing
middleware
functionalities
The Least one which support se-
curity standards is Eucalyptus.
The least one which support
scheduling is OpenNebula while
it is the best in virtual manage-
ment support
[225] OpenNebula,
Eucalyptus,
OpenStack
deployment re-
commendations
to different
user demands
and platform
characteristics
Two of test-bed support similer
VMM except that OpenNebula
doesnt support HyperV and Xen
Server
The CloudSim simulator has been explored to study its abilities to perform
the initial experiments. However, it does not support security implementation
as it requires JAVA extension classes in order to simulate security components.
Moreover, CloudSim does not perform like an actual Cloud.Openstack has been
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Figure 7.2: OpenStack Components [164]
selected to be the experiment platform for this PhD thesis as it support the re-
quired prototype implementation and has a very supportive community of both
academic researchers and commercial bodies.
7.2.2 OpenStack Overview
A key component in building a virtualisation environment is its operation via the
hypervisor. The hypervisor on its own cannot build IaaS. Therefore, a cloud-
stack such as OpenStack, Cloud-Stack or OpenNebul is required. According to
the current industry, OpenStack is likely to become a dominant cloud-stack [100].
OpenStack is an open-source cloud computing platform that offers an IaaS layer
of service. OpenStack IaaS infrastructure supports agent communication. For ex-
ample, network nodes in the OpenStack activate a DHCP agent to deploy a DHCP
service [160]. OpenStack was selected to be the experimental platform for this re-
search as it has a supportive and active community of both academic researchers
and commercial bodies. Figure 7.2 illustrates the OpenStack components [164]
which are known as OpenStack projects as well.
The core components are described in Table 7.2 [162] and are keystone, glance,
nova and neutron. The remaining components are optional and are dashboard ser-
vice (known as horizon), block storage service (known as cinder), object storage
service (known as swift), telemetry service (known as ceilometer) and, orchestra-
tion service (known as heat).
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Table 7.2: OpenStack core components
Component Known
as
Description
Identity Service keystone An integrated management single point that
provides authentication, authorization, and a
catalogue of services. It consists of a server,
drivers and modules. The server is based on the
RESTful interface. The drivers are back end ser-
vices. The modules are middleware run in Open-
stack components to communicate with keystone
during the authorization process. The modules
use Python Web Server Gateway Interface.
Image Service glance A centralised registry service to store resources
such as virtual machine (VM) images. The image
is an operating system that can be installed in
VM.
Compute Ser-
vice
nova A major component in IaaS system that manages
and hosts VMs running in the hypervisor. Its
main modules are implemented in Python.
Networking Ser-
vice
neutron Manage networking services for Openstack IaaS.
Its common agents are Layer3 and DHCP.
Figure 7.3 demonstrates the main interactions between the OpenStack com-
ponents. The main task for IaaS is to provide the virtual machine (VM) to users.
Thus the VM is indicated in a diamond shape. The keystone provides an authen-
tication service between the users and the OpenStack system and between the
OpenStack components themselves. The nova boots the instance processing data
and provision VM. The glance provides VM with the image. The neutron provides
network connections for VMs.
7.2.3 OpenStack Access Control Model (OSAC)
OpenStack can deploy different access control models within its infrastructure
[162]. For example, nova configuration files can be protected via several imple-
mentations such as centralised logging, policy file (policy.json) and MAC frame-
work (Mandatory Access Control). The availability of access control models de-
pends on the hypervisor vendor. The supported models up to the date of writing
this thesis are Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Discretionary Access Control
(DAC), and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
The Openstack access control model (OSAC) that enables both operators and
users to access resources for specific services is a type of RBAC. A simplified
OSAC is illustrated in Figure 7.4 [25]. The keystone [163] supports the notation
of roles and groups. Each user should be associated with a group, and each
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Figure 7.3: OpenStack Conceptual Model [161]
group has a list of roles. For a user to be granted access to a service, Openstack
service takes into consideration his/her role, though as the first authorization
step, the OpenStack PEP (Policy Enforcement Point) takes into consideration the
policy rules associated with the resources before it checks the user role. Therefore,
the policy enforcement middleware enables fine-grained access. Each Openstack
service defines the access control policies rules for its resources in a specific policy
file called policy.json.
[77] The OpenStack manages two types of authorization policy: operation
based and resource based. The operation based specifies access criteria with spe-
cific attributes where policy.json is used, while the resource-based uses RBAC and
it is available to network resources only up to the date of writing this thesis.
The OpenStack access control faces the followed challenges
 An empirical demonstration for Hacking nova through a fake user id [135]
 The policy engine is embedded within the code where it is recommended to
be separated [169]. Therefore, congress policy framework is introduced in
the OpenStack cloud for developers [168].
 Because of the admin role is set as global, a Bug 968696 is occurred. There-
fore, there is a need to investigate the following to solve this problem [230]
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Figure 7.4: OpenStack Access Control (OSAC) [25]
– Merge Policy Header
– Unify Nova, Glance and Cinder
– Move towards a single File
– Break member up into smaller roles
– Remove isadmin from lines
– Fetch policy via Endpoint Policy Extension
7.2.4 Policy Engine
Policy engine in OpenStack is a type of authorization engine that return back a
decision based on some policy rules that indicating if a specific operation is allowed
or denied [230, 25, 162]. The default policy engine is maintained via Oslo policy,
and the access request is issued via API communication. Oslo policy is completely
separated from RBAC model [166]. The developer can view Oslo policy rules that
are related to nova via the command ”oslopolicy-policy-generator –namespace
nova ”. The list of rules verifies if the user credentials are matching to grant
access to the requested resources. The user credentials are stored in the format of
a token. The token holds information related to the token itself in addition to the
user, the project, the domain, the role, the service and the endpoint. The policy
rules are stored in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) file format.
In policy.json, the access policy consists of two main parts ”<target>” : ”<rule>”
[163]. The target is known as an action that indicates the API call for an opera-
tion such as ”start an instance”. The rules can be one of the following: allow all,
deny all, a special check, a comparison of two values, Boolean expressions based on
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Figure 7.5: Nova authorization data-flow [109]
simpler rules. The special check gives the developers an opportunity to extend the
OpenStack policy engine. The special check can indicate, a role that is extracted
from token information, or a complex rule by defining an alias, or a target URL
that delegates the check to an external policy engine.
7.2.5 Nova Authorisation Data-Flow
Each service in Openstack has its own access control configuration points which
involve PEP, PIP, PDP and PAP. The information flow between nova access-
control configuration points is demonstrated in Figure 7.5.
In the original Openstack architecture, Nova PEP will send a token that con-
tains the information of the access request to Nova PIP to retrieve the object
information. Then Nova PEP sends the information of the subject, object and
request to Nova PDP in order for Nova PDP request an access control policy from
Nova PAP. Nova PDP evaluate the access request based on the policy and return
the access decision to Nova PEP.
7.2.6 Forward-Chaining Algorithm
In the search stage of the problem-solving agent (as explained in Section 6.3 ), there
is a need to use a proper searching algorithm that meets the problem scenario and
the input information. The search algorithms that are used in rule-based systems
are backward chaining, forward-chaining and a mixture of both of them [88, 182].
Table 7.3 compares between the reasoning algorithms which are referred to as
chaining in some literature.
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Table 7.3: Comparing Forward-chaining with Backward-chaining
Forward-chaining Backward-chaining
Known as Forward reasoning
(Data driven)
Backward reasoning
(Goal driven)
reasoning Start with A Set of facts to reach a
goal (or hypothesis)
A hypothesis (goal) to
reach the facts behind it
When applicable If the goal is unknown If the set of goals are
known
Table 7.4: Forward chaining algorithm
newFacts= False
For rule in rule-list:
 If all premises match fact-base:
– For each fact in consequences:
* if fact not in fact-base:
· add fact to fact-base
· newFacts = True
If newFacts: goto 1
Many researchers avoid the Logic Theory Machine, which is based on forward-
reasoning due to the computation complexity. However, this complexity is due to
the classical mathematical logic and is not due to the forward-reasoning concept
[46]. Classical mathematical logic such as propositional logic and First-order lo-
gic. Therefore, the computational complexity of forward-chaining when it is used
in nonclassical logic such as deontic logic will be decidable, and it will have an
acceptable computation complexity. A simple algorithm for forward-chaining is
illustrated in Table 7.4. Forward reasoning search iteration is based on facts and
rules to find a conclusion.
7.3 The Proposed ABACsh Implementation for
OpenStack
7.3.1 Enforcement Architecture
The core characteristics of ABACsh are to work as an intelligent agent that sense
the attributes (the environment, the system context, the subject and the object) in
order to search for an access decision using forward chaining (forward-reasoning).
The set of attributes represent facts whereas the set of policy rules represent the
rules.
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Figure 7.6: proposed ABACsh for Openstack nova
The proposed ABACsh enforcement architecture employs the Telemetry ser-
vice of OpenStack. The telemetry service in Openstack provides the facility to
sense the IaaS cloud for environment attributes and the context attributes. The
Telemetry service facilitates polling information from the computing service since
the proposed access control agent ABACsh will use the collected information for
the attributes assignment process. As an example, the nova service access control
process will be used to illustrate ABACsh extension. Section 7.2.5 introduces the
default data flow of nova service access control while Figure 7.6 illustrates nova
service access control with ABACsh extension. The proposed ABACsh enforce-
ment architecture focuses on three configuration points: PIP (Policy Information
Point), PAP (Policy Admission Point) and PDP(Policy Decision Point).
ABACsh enforcement architecture is divided into three components as follows:
1. ABACsh PIP: this is used to collect attributes information from the access con-
trol entities, the environment, and the system context. PIP can be achieved
in Openstack through configuring the Telemetry component. The Telemetry
service is designed to support a billing system by gathering the required in-
formation. Therefore, its structure will be beneficial in providing PIP with
required attribute information. Telemetry consists of five building blocks:
Compute Agent, Central Agent, Collector, Data Store and API Server in
order to perform five essential functions [167]. Figure 7.7 summarises the
Telemeter process to collect data for further analysis. Telemeter can be con-
figured to collect the attributes and save them in JSON file as this file format
is used to store policy rules in OpenStack
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Figure 7.7: Telemeter process
2. ABACsh PAP: The knowledge database for ABACsh model consists of access
rules from SoD rules and Policy rules. The access rules are created by
the system administrator. Those rules will be stored in JSON file format to
facilitate its implementation in OpenStack.
3. ABACsh PDP: this is the logical component which reasons about access control
in ABACsh. ABACsh PDP will get an access-request sentence from ABACsh PEP
that consist of the attributes information with the access request. ABACsh PDP
will load the access rules from ABACsh PAP. ABACsh PDP accomplishes logical
reasoning through forward-chaining algorithm. The result of the logical reas-
oning indicates if the access is permitted or denied.
7.3.2 Prototype Implementation
The first stage of ABACsh deployment in Openstack is to be implemented on nova
component. ABACsh PDP part will be implemented as a prototype.
 Scope and Assumption.
IaaS access control tenant scope can be a single tenant [108], multi-tenant
[150, 40, 176] and collaborating parties a cross-clouds [127, 178].
The implementation scope of access control in this thesis is within single
tenant whereas its hypothesis is applicable to multi-tenant and cross-clouds
as the big concept behind ABACsh is user-id free and attributes-based. The
proposed ABACsh is not replacing OpenStack RBAC in this stage. Instead,
it allows fine-grained access control and opens prospective avenues to replace
RBAC in the near feature.
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 OpenStack Testbed.
Figure 7.8: OpenStack testbed in physical machines
OpenStack aids in deploying IaaS cloud. Figure 7.8 shows the deployed
testbed in this thesis. It is installed in three machines using Ubuntu 16.04
LTS as an operating system and OpenStack-Ocata the latest release (Feb
2017). One machine is configured as a controller which provides OpenStack
main server in addition to networking services (neutron), keystone, nova and
glance. The Two other machines are configured as compute nodes where
virtual machines are hosted. The machines specification is Intel Core i5-
4460 CPU Processor 3.20GHz × 4, 15.5 GiB memory, 235 GB Disk and
2 NICs cards. The testbed networking consists of two LANs: management
network and data network. The management network traffics the Openstack
service communication where data network connects the communication of
the virtual machine. This IaaS is a private cloud where OpenStack services
and the VMs are accessed by the LAN users.
 Data flow.
Nova policy engine is embedded within its configuration files, therefore it is
considered as one of OpenStack’s limitations. However, the default policies
can be overwritten if policy.json is enabled. As explained in Section 7.2.4,
policy.json can be configured to call an external policy engine through URL.
The token which was introduced in Section 7.2.4 hold information that can
be passed from OpenStack keystone to ABACsh policy engine via RESET
GET-call. Nova PEP receives an access decision from ABACsh policy en-
gine via RESET POST-call. ABACsh policy engine use a forward-chaining
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algorithm to produce an access control decision. The access control reason-
ing takes facts which are subject and object attributes, in addition to the
system and context attributes. Based on access rules defined by the admin-
istrator, the access request will be allowed or denied. Figure 7.9 shows the
ABACsh PDP extension to nova authorization. A policy engine is designed and
implemented to add an access control enforcement based on attributes.
Figure 7.9: The prototype Implementation Data flow
In access control terminology, the Openstack users are the subject, the nova re-
sources are the objects, the policy.json is PEP and ABACsh policy engine is the
PDP. The attributes are extracted from the following channels
 The subject attributes can be extracted from keystone token where the avail-
able information is user name, user id, user passward, role id, role name.
The Token information can be retrieved from ’ ’ content-type:application/json’
’ through curl command.
 The extracted nova metrics from the OpenStack system via a command
openstack quota show are considered as the object attributes. The attributes
information is stored in JSON file format
 The nova environment attributes are extracted via the OpenStack command
openstack hypervisor stats show. The attributes information is stored in
JSON file format
 The context attributes are not implemented in this prototype but it is visible
to be included via Telemetry OpenStack service
CHAPTER 7. ABACSH IMPLEMENTATION 91
ABACsh policy engine server is implemented using several programming tech-
nologies. The web server is developed using Python programming language with
web.py since OpenStack services is using python. RESETful API utilities are used
to allow the communication between ABACsh and OpenStack APIs. The forward-
reasoning function is programmed using java since this programming language can
be smoothly integrated into web programming. To allow the technical interaction
between python and java, jpype is used [143, 156]. Data is stored in JSON file
formats such as policy data and attributes data.
7.4 Performance Evaluation
Table 7.5: Performance evaluation metrics
Performance
metrics element
Description The applicable
Access Control
component
response time The time required to process access re-
quest should meet the organization re-
quirement
PEP, PDP, PIP,
PRP
Policy re-
pository and
retrieval
The repositories form used to store and
retrieve the access control policy should
balance the cost of hardware and soft-
ware with the required efficiency by the
organization
PAP, PIP, PRP
Policy distribu-
tion
If there exist a mechanism that can be
used for access control policy distribution
PAP, PIP, PRP
Integrated with
authentication
function
if the subject and object can be associ-
ated with some identifications through an
authentication function.
PIP
Key: Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Administration Point
(PAP), Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Information
Point (PIP), Policy Retrieval Point (PRP)
The aim of this performance evaluation is to detect if ABACsh deployment
in Openstack introduces any significant overhead. The efficiency of deploying an
access control model depends on several factors. The quality of service (QoS)
measures can be calculated by performance properties and computation complex-
ity [231, 97]. The computation complexity for ABACsh has been discussed in
Section 3.4. In this section, the performance metrics are evaluated.
The performance metrics consist of four elements: response time, policy repos-
itory and retrieval, policy distribution, and Integrated with authentication func-
tion [97]. Table 7.5 explains theses performance metrics elements and on which
access control components they can be applied. Since the implemented prototype
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is the ABACsh PDP, the followed experiments will measure response time. With
regard to policy repository and retrieval, the implemented ABACsh use JSON file
to store access control policy which does not add any extra hardware or software
cost to OpenStack IaaS cloud as this form of policy storage is used by OpenStack.
The remaining two performance metrics elements are not calculated in this stage
as PIP is not implemented.
7.4.1 Experiment Content
In this section, the performance evaluation of the implemented ABACsh prototype
in OpenStack is presented. Specifically, ABACsh policy engine which represents
PDP of access control model is discussed. The experiments fall into three parts
where the response time is calculated. Response time indicates the time consumed
by the system in order to process the access request decision call. The response
time has been used to measure the performance in several OpenStack implement-
ations such as in [50, 207]. In these experiments, OpenStack cloud was installed
in physical servers running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS release.
Three types of execution time can be measured [136, 17]. The first one is real-
time that reflects the wall clock where the time is calculated from the start till
the end of the call including the waiting time and time used by other processes.
The second one is user-time that reflects the actual CPU-time spent outside the
kernel during the process call in user-mode without considering other processes.
The third one is sys-time that reflects the actual CPU-time spent within the kernel
during the process execution. Three experimental settings have been implemented
as explained below.
 Experiment 1 (Exp1): The response time for the default access control
model to process access request to nova resources. The default use RBAC
and Oslo policy engine.
 Experiment 2 (Exp2): The response time for extending the default nova
policy engine with ABACsh that utilizes 24 attributes in access control pro-
cessing
 Experiment 3 (Exp3): The response time for extending the default nova
policy engine with ABACsh that use forward-chaining for access control reas-
oning.
7.4.2 Experimental Results and Discussion
Each experiment was run five times, and then the average value was recorded.
Five scenarios were observed by increasing the number of requests from five to
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Table 7.6: Experimental Results
no. of Re-
quests
Response
time
Exp1 Exp2 Exp3
5 real 8.67 8.96 8.77
user 5.56 5.52 5.55
sys 0.42 0.44 0.40
10 real 17.24 17.34 17.24
user 10.99 11.05 11.11
sys 0.88 0.86 0.83
15 real 25.52 26.08 25.87
user 16.46 16.61 16.64
sys 1.25 1.31 1.22
20 real 34.40 34.56 34.45
user 22.07 22.17 22.23
sys 1.68 1.66 1.56
25 real 43.02 43.05 43.07
user 27.64 27.63 27.82
sys 2.09 2.10 1.96
twenty-five as illustrated in Table 7.6. The request indicates an access control
request from a user(subject) to access nova-resources(object).
Based on usability engineering [154, 209] The response time value can be within
three categories: over 0.1 seconds will give the user a feeling that the system is
reacting instantaneously, over 1.0 seconds will give the user a feeling of a delay
but will stay uninterrupted, over 10 seconds the user will lose his/her attention
and will search for something to work on till the computer responds.
Three time values has been recorded as illustrated in Table 7.6: real-time,
user-time and sys-time. In this study, real-time and sys-time have a direct effect
on the performance analysis whereas user-time is reflecting the processing outside
the kernel. The real-time shows the access control execution time in additions to
the other OpenStack cloud processes that introduce some delay by blocking the
process or introducing a waiting time. Therefore, this measurement will indicate
the effect of our extended ABACsh nova to the overall OpenStack system.
The graph in Figure 7.10 compares the real-time for the three set of exper-
iments. The increase is 0.05 seconds when the extended ABACsh nova employ
forward reasoning in access decision processing as shown in Table 7.7. While the
increase is 0.145 seconds when ABACsh uses twenty-four attributes in access de-
cision processing. Therefore, there is an increase of 0.56% when attributes are
added to the policy engine and 0.19% when the forward-chaining algorithm is ad-
ded. Consequently, the increase in response time is negligible in reference to the
usability engineering when the nova default access control is extended with part
of the proposed ABAC enhancement.
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Figure 7.10: real-time for access control processing in nova
Table 7.7: Comparing real-time values
Experiment 2 - Experiment 1 Experiment 3 - Experiment 1
0.29 0.1
0.1 0
0.56 0.35
0.16 0.05
0.03 0.05
average average
0.145 0.05
percentage percentage
0.56% 0.19%
On the other hand, sys-time gives the process execution only within the kernel
regardless of the other tasks. Therefore, the time for the 25 requests dropped from
43.02 seconds within real-time to 2.09 seconds within sys-time during Exp1 which
involve default nova access control. The sys-time comparison for the three experi-
ments is illustrated in Figure 7.11. The results show a slightly better performance
of 5.5% for extending the default nova access control when forward-reasoning has
been utilized whereas an increase of 4% over the default nova when 24-attributes
are used in the policy-engine as illustrated in Table 7.8.
From these results, the ABACsh shows an acceptable performance compared
to the default OpenStack access control within nova service.This section demon-
strates the enhanced attribute-based access control ABACsh performance improve-
ment when attributes and forward reasoning algorithm are employed. It has been
noticed that the performance improvement is liner in Figure 7.10 when only at-
tributes are involved in access decision. Whereas in Figure 7.11 when forward
reasoning is involved, an improvement in performance has been noticed. This in-
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dicates an opportunity of enhancing the IaaS-cloud security when logical reasoning
and AI mechanism are involved in access control system.
Figure 7.11: sys-time for access control processing in nova
Table 7.8: Comparing sys-time values
Experiment 2 - Experiment 1 Experiment 3 - Experiment 1
0.02 -0.02
-0.02 -0.05
0.06 -0.03
-0.02 -0.12
0.01 -0.13
average average
0.05 -0.07
percentage percentage
4% -5.5%
7.4.3 Limitations of Experiment
The main aim of the experiments in this chapter is to study the performance
improvement when attribute based access control model is introduced into IaaS
cloud. The experiment scale is limited to a private cloud in a LAN set-up. There-
fore, the network performance metrics has not been studied such as the latency
and throughput.
The implementation in this thesis does not involve the PIP component of the
access control, therefore only a simple forward reasoning algorithm has been de-
ployed without knowledge update component. The used database for knowledge
is written manually whereas the system should use an automated information col-
lection method if PIP is implemented. One subject is involved in each experiment,
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therefore multi-access has not been investigated in this thesis. Multi-tenant study
is a critical future work.
7.5 Comparative Study of ABAC Models
Implementation in OpenStack
OpenStack IaaS-cloud is open-source and several recognized bodies are contrib-
uting to its development such as NASA, Rackspace, RedHat, CISCO and many
others listed in OpenStack contributors [165].
Table 7.9: Compare the ABACsh implementation in OpenStack with related work
[152] [25] [109] Proposed
ABACsh
PEP OpenStack services (Nova, Glance ,,,)
architecture client-server based (RESTful API )
PDP Based on
Prevention-
Based Ac-
cess Control
(PBAC)
Based on Policy
Machine (PM)
mechanism
within Open-
Stack LAN
Based on ex-
ternal Policy
engine service
outside Open-
Stack LAN
Based on ex-
ternal Policy
engine service
within Open-
Stack LAN
ABAC
model
None Role-centric
based model
with user at-
tributes
ABACα Proposed
ABACsh
Evaluation
metrics
Execution time
in sec,Exp1:
without
PBAC,Exp2:
20 Edges,Exp3:
1000 Edges
Performance:
Time in
sec/no. re-
quest, OS RBAC,
OS PM RBAC,
OS PM ABAC
Performance:
Tim in sec/no.
user and no.
request attrib-
utes values,
0=RBAC,
5,10,15,20
attributes
Performance:
Time in sec/no.
request, 0 at-
tributes and
default OSAC,
24 attributes
with the ABAC
extension,24
attributes
with forward-
chaining al-
gorithm
OpenStack platform is flexible and allows the developers to modify the source
code. Riad in [179] focused on studying the type and the number of attributes
required in ABAC. He implemented a prototype in OpenStack and discusses the
average time that is taken by keystone to generate a token when attributes are
included and when it is excluded. Ibrahim in [159] discusses an XACML extension
for Openstack but without practical evaluation. The most related work to this
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research is summarized in Table 7.9 with a comparison to the proposed ABACsh
extension. In contrast to [152], the proposed work is a type of ABAC model where
[152] is based on Prevention data concept. The work done by [25] concentrated
on user attributes whereas the proposed ABACsh involve four types of attributes
since ABAC model is meant to involve attributes of the subject, the object, the
environment and the context based on the literature review. Moreover, in [25], the
process of assigning values to user attributes are not explained as it is out of their
research scope. Therefore, this thesis contributes in giving details of attributes
value assignment in ABACsh PIP configuration point via Telemetry service. The
accomplished evaluation by [109] focuses on the performance when attributes are
added to the token within keystone, while in ABACsh the focus was on the per-
formance of the complete access control process from getting the access request
till returning the access decision.
7.6 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, a demonstration of the enhanced attribute-based access control
ABACsh implementation is presented. Openstack platform is used to deploy IaaS
cloud since it is open-source and supports agent architecture. The OpenStack
platform has been extended to implement ABACsh by adding an external policy
engine. An enforcement architecture is designed, and a prototype is implemented.
The enforcement architecture use Telemeter OpenStack component to implement
agent-structure to collect the required information for access control process.
The implemented prototype includes and extend policy engine that utilises
forward-chaining algorithm to reason about access decision and adds attribute
values for the object. The performance evaluation consist of three experiments.
The Experiment1 involves the default OpenStack access control. The Experiment2
involves ABACsh with 24-attributes value for object. The Experiment3 involves
ABACsh with policy-engine that is deploying forward-chaining. The experimental
results shows a negligible increase in response time for real-time and system-time
as illustrated in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8. Based on usability engineering, if the
response time value reach 0.1 seconds, then the user will feel that the system is
reacting instantaneously. The average increase in response time does not exceed
0.15 for all cases which indicates that the increase in response time is negligible.
This implementation can be considered as an initial step in deploying ABAC
model in IaaS cloud access control. There is a wide space to extend and improve
this implementation such as:
 Deploying PIP via OpenStack telemetry component
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 Study multi-tenancy scenarios by involving multi-subject.
 Scenarios to study the forward reasoning algorithm within the best and the
worst case.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This thesis investigates the security challenges facing IaaS cloud and focuses on
the access control model. The IaaS access control requires dynamic and fine-
grained features. Therefore, this thesis proposes an intelligent attribute based
access control model and discusses its implementation. Section 8.1 summarises
the thesis contributions, and Section 8.2 describes potential future work.
8.1 Conclusion
IaaS cloud provides dynamic, elastics, multi-tenant and easy to configure com-
puting infrastructure. It is constructed based on several technologies such as
virtualisation and grid computing. Besides the benefits gained from IaaS, there
are several challenges such as the security aspects. This thesis focusses on enhan-
cing IaaS cloud security from access control perspective. Due to the IaaS dynamic
environment characteristics and the flexibility for the users to join and leave the
system, there is a need for an access control model that is able to cope with this
environment. The literature relating to IaaS cloud access control reveal an ap-
proach to introduce attribute-based access control model into cloud computing.
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) faces two main challenges to be deployed
in IaaS cloud. The first one is related to formal ABAC specification and reasoning.
The second one is related to the specification of its conceptual characteristics.
This thesis contributes to the IaaS cloud security enhancement by introducing
an attribute-based access control model that meets IaaS cloud characteristics.
Furthermore, an artificial intelligence framework is designed and implemented in
OpenStack testbed. The enhanced attribute-based access control (ABACsh ) is
designed to be context-aware and supports SoD, as discussed in Chapter 3. To
the best knowledge of the author, there is no existing formal logic that is able
to describe, verify and reason about ABAC models; this thesis introduces an Ac-
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cess Control Logic (ACL) combined with Deontic Logic (DL) that can satisfy
this requirement, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. The proposed ACL-DL is used
to formally specify ABACsh and logical infer its access decision, as explained in
Chapter 5. The formal specification of an access control is a critical necessity for
facilitation of the implementation stage. An intelligent framework is proposed to
support ABACsh dynamic feature as introduced in Chapter 6. An implementa-
tion of a prototype of this framework is illustrated in Chapter7 with performance
analysis. The contributions of this thesis are summarised in the table 8.1
The understanding of IaaS access-control requirements is essential to study the
improvement opportunities in cloud security. The access control in IaaS is still
an evolving area as the current implemented model is RBAC whereas ABAC is
recommended model by several researchers. Moreover, applications that involve
artificial intelligent and formal logic is a critical research that allows a significant
improvement in security systems. The modal logic field can contribute in reasoning
about knowledge which supports the development of expert systems. The link
between these areas can open critical research directions.
8.2 Future Work
This research can open further studies and applications. ABACsh can be im-
proved by adding support for access control concepts such as delegation and
object-oriented concept such as hierarchy. Take into consideration that ABAC
models should be ID-free and based on attributes to maintain its flexibility and
dynamic features. Further study for ACL-DL can be conducted using a theorem
prover, such as NuSmv, to implement an automated reasoning tool. The proposed
ABACsh enforcement architecture can be deployed via Telemeter component in
OpenStack, where a Heat component can be used in the implementation phase
to construct an intelligent ABACsh that can be employed in a real IaaS cloud
operating environment.
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Table 8.1: Summary of the Thesis Contributions
Chapter
no.
Main contribution Details objective
2 Analytical study to
identify access con-
trol challenges and
requirements in IaaS
cloud
Study the security chal-
lenges related to access
control in IaaS. Identify
IaaS access control re-
quirements. Identify the
approaches that can contrib-
ute to enhancing IaaS access
control systems.
Obj.1,
Obj.2
3 An enhanced attribute
based access control
ABACsh
Context-aware. Support
SoD
Obj.3
4 A formal logic that is
able to specify ABACsh,
known as Access Con-
trol Logic Deontic Logic
(ACL-DL)
Formal logic language.
Kripke structure. ACL-
DL Formal verification
Obj.4
5 A formal specification
and logical reasoning for
ABACsh using ACL-DL
Formal description of the
ABACsh states, relations,
and functions. Logical
reasoning about ABACsh.
Explained through a case
study
Obj.4
6 An intelligent frame-
work for ABACsh
A framework that is based
on agent and logic. Utilise
knowledge-agent implemen-
ted through rule-based ex-
pert system mechanisms.
Obj.5
7 ABACsh implement-
ation in IaaS cloud
testbed (OpenStack)
show the visibility of the
proposed intelligent frame-
work for ABACsh. An
enforcement architecture
for the ABACsh agent is
designed using OpenStack
components. ABACsh PDP is
deployed in OpenStack
Obj.6
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